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Preface
This volume by Professor Josep Maria Colomer could hardly be published
at a more suitable moment.
Europe is going through a delicate time. After some tough years of
institutional enlargement and consolidation, which have led to a European
Union of 27 countries and the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the
repercussions of the international financial crisis of 2007-08 and the Great
Recession of 2009 have shaken the construction of Europe and particularly
one of its most defining features: the euro, the currency shared by 16 out of
the 27 member states.
Given these events and the trends in constructing Europe that we have seen
over the last thirty years, we need some historical perspective, such as that
provided by Professor Colomer with his original work that compares the
processes to create America and Europe, both in terms of political entities
that are continental in scope and, as he argues very well, share imperial
ambitions.
What we know today as the United States of America is the result of a long
andcomplexprocessofunifyingterritoriesthatwerepreviouslyindependent.
The territorial expansion only partly respond to determining factors of a
clear geographical or geopolitical nature. From the time it became
independent from the British crown, at the end of the 18th century, this
new great power needed a century and a half to take shape and it wasn’t
until the second decade of the 20th century that the USA started to take on
the features of a federal state but with a strong central administration, as we
know it today. En route, this new federation even suffered a civil war that
was on the verge of stemming the creation of what would be the new great
world power by the middle of the 20th century.
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Knowing the difficulties endured by the Founding Fathers in building their
political union and the great role played by the United States of America in
the world in the last hundred years, both in geopolitical and also in
technological and economic terms, should serve as a benchmark for
European citizens and their political leaders when evaluating the complex
political and economic juncture currently faced by European peoples and
their shared institutions.
The acceleration of the enlargement of the Union since the 1990s was the
result of the fall of the BerlinWall and the collapse of the communist regimes
in Eastern Europe. These successive enlargements, still not completed, were
ethically inexcusable andpoliticallyunstoppable and formanyof thecountries
liberated from pro-Soviet totalitarian regimes they have ensured a one-way
ticket towards liberal democracy and economic and social progress.
However, Europe’s institutional architecture was undoubtedly ill prepared
for this avalanche of member countries, which in just a few years has
doubled the Union’s surface area and expanded its population to more than
500 million citizens. And it wasn’t just the institutions that weren’t ready.
European citizens were probably not sufficiently aware of what integration
wouldentail.This isparticularly true fromaneconomicandsocialviewpoint,
due to significant differences in the degree of economic development and to
the relevance as a whole of the countries joining the Union.
Seen from this perspective, we should not be surprised that the process of
redefining theUnion’s institutional frameworkhasbeen, overall, insufficient.
Therewas apressingneed toproceedwith reforms, to improve the legitimacy
of European politics and to speed up decision-making. These goals were
already important before the enlargements and the growing complexity of
the 27-strong Union has made them even more necessary.
The failure of the referendums on the proposed European constitution and
the subsequent approval of the LisbonTreaty, representing a less emblematic
but perhaps similar alternative in practical terms, must be interpreted as the
outcome of a process of European construction that, for better or worse, has
often not followed a strictly coherent path. In this case, the operational
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reforms of the Union should have been approved before the processes of
enlargement, but what is proper or advisable in theory is not always
politically feasible, and the course of European history has set a pace to
which the Union’s policies and institutions have had to adapt.
When we Europeans thought we would have a few years to digest the
enlargements and to develop the new institutional framework, once again
external circumstances altered the pace of European integration, and most
significantly. The international financial crisis and its extremely serious
repercussions on economic growth (the 2009 recession has been the worst
in the last seventy years) have exerted huge pressure on another of the key
elements in the European project: the single currency.
It is common knowledge that the process of creating the euro has been
political in nature, right from the start. One more step in the economic
integration of Europe and therefore in giving up a very significant amount
of political power at the national level.
Some might say that the pace was too fast, perhaps too bold, or the result of
what the elite wanted, far removed from popular feeling. Others, however,
might argue that it was an ambitious operation, looking to the future,
thinking beyond local interests to a planetary scale and already taking into
account the world of the 21st century with its emerging new powers: China
but also India, Brazil and others. These are new empires, as duly noted by
Josep Maria Colomer. In Europe, this continent-wide and integrating view
dates way back in history, perhaps always promoted by those Europeans
who have been ahead of their time.Hence thewords by JoséOrtega yGasset,
written even before the SecondWorldWar that set many peoples of Europe
and the world against each other, reveal that we are facing a wide ranging
human and political change:
“The real situation of Europe would, then, appear to be this: its
long and splendid past has brought it to a new stage of existence
where everything has increased; but, at the same time, the
institutions surviving from that past are dwarfed and have become
an obstacle to expansion. Europe has been built up in the form of
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small nations. In a way, the idea and the sentiment of nationality
have been her most characteristic invention. And now she finds
herself obliged to exceed herself. This is the outline of the
enormous drama to be staged in the coming years. Will she be
able to shake off these survivals or will she remain for ever their
prisoner? Because it has already happened once before in history
that a great civilisation has died through not being able to adopt a
substitute for its traditional idea of the state…”1
The political component of the single currency project was also present in
the Union’s earlier advances, such as the creation of the single market.
However, the impact in terms of eroding sovereignty is of a radically
different nature with the euro. It’s no longer a question of gradually
transferring powers, subject to a laborious process of negotiation and ex-
post legal and administrative control. With the euro, the loss of sovereignty
only becomes evident in exceptional but ultimately inexorable situations,
when sooner or later external circumstances suddenly alter the competitive
situation of the different member states and it becomes clear that the lack of
monetary independence limits the capacity to respond unilaterally of all
members of the Union.
From a technical point of view, it was already well-known at the beginning
of the 1990s, when the foundations of the project were being discussed,2
that for an area integrated in monetary terms to work, there would need
to be a certain degree of fiscal integration and greater mobility of labour.
Once again, European leaders furthered political integration by increasing
economic ties. In political terms, this option was understandable but full
of risks that would have to be handled at some point. It is now time to
accept, in all clarity, the political dimension of the currency shared by the
countries in the Union, as has Chancellor Merkel, when she stated that “If
the euro fails…Europe fails too, and the idea of European unification.
1. La rebelión de lasmasas, by José Ortega y Gasset (1930) (Editorial Austral. Commemorative edition, 2009 - from
the revised edition of 1939, page 196.)
2. See, for example, the volume“One Market One Money”, in European Economy, No 44, October 1990.
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We have a common currency, but no common political and economic
union. And this is exactly what we must change”.3
Very recently Javier Solana4 reminded us, from the viewpoint afforded to
him by his highly extensive experience in senior positions of international
diplomacy, that “theEuropeanUnionmust feel proudofwhat it has achieved
and be more aware of what it represents”. I can only agree wholeheartedly
with these words. I trust that books such as the one produced by Professor
Colomer help all of us Europeans to acquire the appropriate long-term
perspective and to understand, in all its dimensions, the historic crossroads
we are currently facing, so that all together we may decide to advance in
constructing the United States of Europe.
Jordi Gual
Chief Economist and Head of Research
”la Caixa”
Research Department
3. Financial Times, 14 May, 2010, page 3.
4. La Vanguardia, 19 May, 2010.
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I. Introduction
America is “the embryo of a great empire”
Alexander Hamilton
“... an empire of liberty”
Thomas Jefferson
“I believe there is no real answer for the European problem
until there is definitely established a United States of Europe”
Dwight Eisenhower
“If the European countries succeed in uniting,
their three to four hundred million inhabitants would know,
by the fruit of their common heritage, a prosperity, a glory,
a happiness that no boundary, no border could contain...
We must construct such a thing as the United States of Europe”
Winston Churchilll
A politically united Europe will be “a sort of second America”
Jean Monnet
The processes of building the United States of America since the late-
eighteenth century and the European Union since mid-twentieth century are
among the major claims for the possibility of a vast, continental-size political
unit based on democratic principles. While the European Union project is
still full of uncertainties, the previous experience of building theUnited States
of America offers the best reference and hope for a successful achievement.
The United States was created in the late eighteenth century as a union of
previously existing independent states. However, its consolidation as a federal
democratic union took more than a century.The crucial period was between
the Civil War in the late nineteenth century and the First World War in the
early twentieth century, when it established clear territorial limits and
completed its internal institutionalization at both local and federal levels.
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As shown in the following pages, the building of the United States of
America and the building of the European Union have raised similar major
problems, which can be addressed by taking inspiration and learning from
each other’s experiences. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
European Union has achieved higher levels of economic integration on
some issues than the United States of America did about one hundred years
ago. Yet it has not completed the delimitation of fixed external borders and
has not attained a solid constitutional framework. As it was the case for the
United States, for the current EuropeanUnion putting an end to the process
of territorial expansion seems to be a necessary condition to achieve internal
institutional stability and robust federal formulas.
The structure of the book is as follows. After this Introduction, the second
part, ‘Delimiting the Territory’, remarks that building an empire from
previously existing states implies renouncing a single source of sovereignty
in favor of division of powers among multiple levels of government. The
stories of the United States territorial expansion from the initial Atlantic
core to the conquest of the West during the nineteenth century and of the
European Union successive enlargements during the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries show how external borders can eventually be fixed.The limits
of the new unions are not determined by geography or destiny, but,
somewhat arbitrarily, just reflect the union’s capacity of assimilation and
consistent institutionalization of its components. Currently, and in contrast
to the United States, the European Union still has some ‘frontiers’ to be
settled in a more stable way, particularly in the Balkans, Turkey and the
Easterncountries. InEurope, theunion’s territorial expansionand increasing
integration is also inducing some internal restructuring of the larger states
in favor or further internal decentralization and the strengthening of
regional and local governments.
The third part of the book addresses the processes of institutionalization of
both unions as facilitated by the establishment of external limits and borders
control. Even if well-defined institutional rules for decision-making are
largely adopted ‘from above’ in conditions of initially deficient democracy,
they can be able to promote some degree of ‘loyalty’ from the citizens, which
favors institutional stability and union-wide policy-making. In both the
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constituent processes in Philadelphia in the late eighteenth century and in
Brussels in the early twenty-first century, a controversy developed between
those in favor of a stronger federal union and those preferring to give
priority to states’ sovereignty. In none of the cases the ratification by the
states of the drafts elaborated by constituent conventions was easy or
immediate. In practice, some fluctuations in the relative power of the union,
the states and the regions or counties can be identified over time. In the
United States it took a long period to establish in practice a real system of
mutual ‘checks and balances’ among institutions, which were not clearly
shaped until the early twentieth century. In the European Union a form of
semi-presidential regime with a dual executive has been adopted, but the
enforcement of some basic new rules is still incomplete and has been
delayed.
The final part summarizes the components of the transition from sovereign
states to a democratic federation, which have relevant implications for the
future of the European Union.
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II. Delimiting the Territory
The notion of ‘empire’ can account for the historical and present
configurations of the United States of America (USA) and of the European
Union (EU). An empire is a compound of diverse groups and territorial
units without fixed or stable territorial limits. Most of human history has
developed within the framework of vast empires, rather than with the West
European modern form of nation-state. ‘Empire’ as a polity or community
should not be confounded with ‘imperialism’ as a policy, which can be
practiced not only by empires, but also by nation-states or cities. An empire
can be conceived as a federation in themaking to the extent that the process
of coordinating diverse political units across a very large and varied territory
may lead to the adoption of more stable and more democratic institutional
formulas.This was precisely the case of the development of theUnited States
of America during the nineteenth century and may be the case of the
European Union during the twenty-first century too.
Although the design of a large federation for the United States of America
was already done by late eighteenth century, actually the USA did not attain
fixed borders and stable federal institutions until early twentieth century.
By the early twenty-first century, the EuropeanUnion is still in the ‘imperial’
stage of federation-design and building. It can be argued that there is strong
relationship between external territorial consolidation and internal
institutional arrangement. As happened with the USA, the internal stability
of the EU and its complete transformation into a democratic federation will
largely depend on the establishment of stable external territorial limits and
of an internal democratic system of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ divisions of
powers.
The processes of building these two large polities in America and Europe
have shared important defining characteristics of ‘empire’ which, in contrast
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to those defining a sovereign ‘state’, can be summarized as follows: Empires
have a very large size, in terms of both territory and population. They do
not have fixed or permanent boundaries; empires tend to expand over the
territory, up to the point of conflict with other empires, and when in decline
they may also contract.
An empire implies a compound of diverse groups and territorial units. In
ancient andmedieval times, an empire could be comprised of cities, republics,
counties, principalities, bishoprics, and other varied forms of political
organization. Currently, democratic empires may also include political
units organized with different forms of parliamentary or presidential,
unichamber or multichamber, monarchical or republican governments.
Multiethnic federations can be arranged with less heterogeneous institutional
regimes. But they may be linked to the center by diverse institutional formulas.
Finally, an imperial-type organization includes a set of multilevel, often
overlapping jurisdictions. Within an empire, no authority typically rules
with exclusive powers. Rather, the central government may rule indirectly
through local governments; the latterdevelop self-governmenton important
issues; and power sharing is widespread.
In contrast to ‘empire’, the ‘state’, which was the typical West European form
of government from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, can be
defined by the opposite characteristics. A state is defined, first of all, by fixed
territory, typically of large or middle size, and formal boundaries. The clear
establishment and foreign recognition of the territorial limits of a state are
intended as protection from external attacks, invasions, immigrants, and
imports.
TheWest European, modern state claims ‘sovereignty’ or supreme authority
over a territory and population. It recognizes no other source of jurisdiction
but itself. The state’s power to make ultimate decisions is recognized by
other sovereign states. Finally, any state has monopolistic or reserved
functionswith exclusive jurisdictionwithin its territory.Whether dictatorial
or democratic, it is organized with an internal hierarchy of powers. In order
to facilitate the exercise of its functions and consummate its exclusiveness,
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it tends to establish a uniform administration over the territory, as well as to
promote thehomogenizationof important social and cultural characteristics
of its subjects or citizens.
As can be seen, these defining characteristics of empire and state are
mutually exclusionary. Actually, the first modern states emerged from and
consolidated themselves against previously existing empires. Both the states
in North America having proclaimed their independence from the British
dominion and the states in Europe which would eventually join the Union
had affirmed their ‘sovereignty’ since the eighteenth century. Sovereignty
was conceived as an absolute, perpetual, inalienable and indivisible power,
the supreme source of authority within a well-defined territory. Then,
building a new continent-wide empire implied renouncing a single source
of sovereignty in favor of division of powers among multiple levels of
government.
2.1. From Frontiers to Borders
As typical of empires, and in contrast to an essential feature of sovereign
states, there are no territorial limits in the United States constitution or in the
EuropeanUnion treaties.The real limits of both unions depend on the capacity
of assimilation of new territories located at long distances from the initial core
andwithsignificantdifferencesineconomicstructuresandethniccomposition
of the population regarding the previous ones. In general, the farther away
and the more different the new territories from the founding ones, the less
integrative and more coercive the means by which they can be incorporated
into the empire tend to be. As a consequence, in both processes of building
the USA and the EU, the territorial expansion of the initial core eventually
slowed down until it reached substantial stability.
For theUnited States, the process of annexing the bulk of its current territory
since the initial 13 colonies became independent states took more than 60
years –between approximately 1787 and 1850–. The territory of the initial
core was finally multiplied by about four. But the initial core is still much
more densely populated: the population in the original territories at the
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time of independence from Britain is today about half of total population.
For the European Union, the process of enlargements from its initial 6
member-states, which started formally in 1957, has already lasted more
than 50 years, while several large territories remain potential subjects for
further inclusion. So far, the initial territory of the founding members (not
counting their former colonies overseas) has been multiplied by three. But
like in the U.S., the population of the six initial EU member-states is today
about half of total population.
2.1.1. The United States expansion
The process of building the United States of America involved sustained
fights against the European colonial empires in the Americas, initially Great
Britain, of course, but also France and Spain, and later and in the periphery,
the Russian and the Japanese empires. Four types of processes of expansion
of the USA can be distinguished by territories increasingly distant from the
initial core, which have been implemented in different periods. Each model
involves different degrees of coercion, from more integration to greater
violence. They can be called decolonization, purchase, infiltration, and
invasion, respectively.
Decolonization. British colonies had been established in North America
since the beginning of the 17th century (with Virginia having been set up in
1619).Their consolidation during the 18th century involvedmajor conflicts
with France, especially the so-called ‘Great War for Empire’ or ‘French and
IndianWar’ (1754-63), afterwhich the territories to theeastof theMississippi
river were left in the hands of Britain, while those to the west of that river
were taken from France and given to Spain.
A so-called Continental Congress, formed by representatives of thirteen of
the British colonies along the Atlantic coast, declared independence in
1776. The union was initially created mainly as a mechanism of self-
protection from Britain. When the war for independence was won in 1783,
the initial territory of the thirteen colonies was enlarged to more than
double the area, with other British lands located to the north and to the
west of the Appalachian Mountains until the Mississippi.
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The independentists aspired to include Canada. In the Articles of
Confederation, they stated: “Canada acceding to this confederation, and
adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into,
and entitled to all the advantages of this Union”. During the subsequent war
withBritain,United States troopswent further north andoccupiedMontreal
and large parts ofQuebec. But the Britishmanaged to defend theirNorthern
colonies from independence for another eighty years. A settlement would
be achieved between the UK and the USA in 1818 to establish the border
with Canada along the 49th parallel, that is, crossing the Great Lakes so as
for both sides to have access to them. Thus, most of the further U.S.
expansion headed south- and west-wards.The ‘frontier’, that is, the disputed
regions at the edges of the settled area, shifted towards the Pacific and the
Gulf of Mexico for many years.
The Continental Congress established that the United States would enlarge
not by the expansion of existing states but by the creation or admission of
new states. The initial thirteen colonies approved new state constitutions in
the process of approving the United States constitution in 1789. But the rest
of the territory, that is, about half of the total area separated from Britain,
remained under the control of the new central authority in Washington for
several decades. Eleven newU.S. states were eventually formed there within
a period of sixty years.
Purchase. After the former French colonies west of Mississippi, which had
been given to Spain, were devolved to France in 1800, the government of
the United States purchased them from Napoleon Bonaparte in 1803 for
$15 million (equivalent to about $215 million in today’s dollars). The
Louisiana territory was in fact the west side of the basin of the Mississippi
andMissouri rivers,whichwasbounded to thewestby theRockyMountains,
to the north by the remaining British colony in Canada, and to the south by
the colony of New Spain. With the purchase of Louisiana, the United States
doubled its territory. Eleven new U.S. states were eventually formed there
within a period of more than one hundred years.
Another major purchase was Florida, which had been devolved to Spain
after independence. Itwas acquired by theUnited States in 1819, in exchange
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for renouncing claims to Texas and $5 million (equivalent to about $70
million today). Finally, theUnited States purchasedAlaska from the Russian
empire in 1867, for $7.2 million ($110 million of today’s dollars). In spite of
its territorial discontinuity with the rest of the country, it became a U.S.
organized territory in 1912 and a U.S. state in 1959.
Other proposed purchases emerged among political and entrepreneurial
circles of the United States by the mid 19th century. They included, most
prominently, the acquisition of Cuba from Spain, as proposed by president
Franklin Pierce in 1854 for $120 million (what would have been almost $3
billion in today’s dollars!); the annexation of Santo Domingo, as proposed
by president Ulysses Grant in 1870; as well as the construction of an
American isthmian canal inNicaragua,whichwas votedby theU.S. congress
in 1900. But they were never substantiated.
Infiltration. Another pattern of decolonization of neighboring or nearby
territories can be identified for a number of cases, which includes the
following steps. First, American traders, explorers or settlers, usually with
high entrepreneurial and productive spirit, establish themselves in a foreign
territory. Eventually they become a pressure group or a political forcewhich,
in alliancewith local groups, is able to challenge the foreignpower dominion
or overthrow the existing local government and declare an independent
republic. Third, the U.S. army intervenes in order to protect the American
citizens and re-establish peace. Finally, the territory may be annexed to the
United States.
Elements of thismodel canbe identified in several processes in theperiphery
of the United States. Specifically, in the south, in Texas, which declared its
independence fromMexico and formed the ‘lone star’ republic in 1836, but
became a U.S. state in 1845; in the far west, in California, independent from
Mexico in 1846 and a U.S. state in 1850, as well as in Oregon, organized as
a territory separated from the British in 1848 becoming a U.S. state in 1859;
and in the Pacific islands of Hawaii, where the local monarchy was replaced
by American residents with a republic in 1893, it became a U.S. territory in
1900, and a state in 1959.
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Similar attempts were implemented in Canada, where U.S. ‘filibusters’
prompted rebellions in 1837, with the aim of establishing a republican
government seen as a reprise of theAmericanRevolution against the British,
but were to no avail. Other infiltrations took place further south, in Panama,
which split from Colombia in 1903, but it never became annexed.The canal
of Panama, which was put under U.S. control from 1914 and until the end of
the century, was basically conceived by the American entrepreneurs as a
waterway that would facilitate transports between the Atlantic and the
Pacific coasts of the United States, thus putting the frontier further south
than formally established.
Invasion. A number of private armed expeditions were organized by so-
called ‘filibusters’, as mentioned, especially to islands in the Caribbean sea
and to Central America, with the aim of expanding the South of the United
States into a slave-based tropical empire. They include interventions in
Cuba in 1851, Nicaragua in 1855 (where a slave-based dictatorship was
enforced for a few years), and Honduras in 1859.
From 1823 onwards, the so-called Monroe doctrine, summarized with the
lemma ‘America for the Americans’, stated that European powers were no
longer allowed to colonize or interfere with the affairs of the newly
independent states in the Americas. Under this cover, the United States
armydirectly intervenedinanumberofcountries intheWesternhemisphere.
More than half of the territory of recently independentMexico, to the north
of the Rio Grande, was incorporated into the United States after a military
expedition, which went as far as entering Mexico city in 1848. There were
calls for the annexation of “All Mexico,” arguing that it would be the best
way to ensure future peace in the region, but they were not fulfilled. Mexico
withdrew its claims to Texas and was compensated with $18.2 million. The
annexed territory was rounded out by the Gadsden purchase from Mexico
for $10 million. Five new U.S. states were eventually formed there within a
period of more than sixty years. Again the United States brought troops
down to the Rio Grande to put pressure on French emperor Louis Napoleon
III to withdraw fromMexico in 1867.
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2.1.2. Fixing the American borders
Once the limits of the territory of the Union were broadly envisaged,
institutionalizing the United States of America required more social and
legal unification. This was achieved through several mechanisms for
integration involving high degrees of coercion and violence. The hottest
dividing line ran, of course, between the commercial and industrial North
and the slave-based agrarian South.The initial attachment of the population
to the Southern states implied reluctance and alienation to strengthening
the Union, but it became noncompliance, rebellion and war.
The Civil War. Initially, the slaves fleeing from the Southern states were
caught and sent back to the South by the federal authorities. President Lincoln
considered a gradual freeing of slaves, including monetary compensation to
their owners, to be sent to Liberia or Panama. But the secession of the
Confederate states in the South triggered the Civil War. Lincoln eventually
realized that the Union could not be preserved without a high degree of legal
homogeneity regarding basic human rights, which led him to declare the
freedom of slaves.
The Reconstruction after the Civil War proved to be more difficult than
expected due to resilient divisions within the country. The industrial
North-East and the agrarian South had opposite interests that also drove
different orientations regarding future expansions and foreign policy.
While the industrial North-East could gain from a strategy of imperial
expansion designed to open and secure new markets for its exports to
Latin America and Asia, the agrarian South feared competition by lower-
cost immigrants from other agrarian countries and supported ‘anti-
imperialist’ positions.
The Spanish-American War. Some politicians thought that an external war
against a foreign enemy, namely the remnants of the Spanish empire, could
work as an internally unifying drive. By the Spanish-American War in 1898,
the United States occupied the penultimate Spanish colonies –four islands or
archipelagos in America and Asia–, complemented with compensation of
$20 million.
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But for the first time, none of the annexed territories, all overseas, became a
U.S. state. They were seized as colonies or protectorates. Guam remained a
U.S. territory. A protectorate was established in Puerto Rico, which became
a U.S. territory in 1917 and a ‘Commonwealth’ in 1952. The Philippines
eventually became independent, although as late as 1946. Cuba was
independent since 1902, although subjected to several United States direct
military interventions and close vigilance of its internal politics until 1934.
TheLatinAmericanBackyard.The so-calledTheodoreRooseveltCorollary
to the Monroe Doctrine asserted the right of the United States to intervene
in Latin America in cases of “flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a Latin
American nation”. Subsequent arbitrating or pacifying interventions and
occupations were implemented in Nicaragua in 1910-25 and 1927-33,
Mexico in 1914 and 1916-17, Haiti in 1915-34, and theDominican Republic
in 1916-24. However, in contrast to the previous processes of enlargement
mentioned above, these interventions did not substantiate themselves into
the annexation of new territories into the United States. The borders of the
empire had been stably established at the Atlantic ocean in the east, Canada
and the large enclave of Alaska to the north, around the Gulf of Mexico in
the south, and a few islands in the Pacific ocean to the west.The decision by
the United States to join the Second World War was triggered precisely by
an attack by the Japanese empire on its western border, in Hawaii.
After WWII, the U.S. troops intervened again against revolutionary or
populist movements in most countries of their ‘backyard’, usually in
coordination with local political and military groups and only for brief
periods. Cases include Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominican
republic in 1965, andGrenada in 1983, while providing covert aid to domestic
counter-revolutionaries in Honduras in 1979-81, El Salvador in 1981-84, and
Nicaragua in 1981-89. Yet, again, with these actions, theUnited States was not
trying to expand its territory, but to assert and protect its southern ‘frontier’
in the Gulf of Mexico, which had in fact become its formal border.
As suggested by the previous overview, the external borders of the
American empire were not pre-determined by geography or destiny.
Several additional territories could have been included in the Union,
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while some current members could have remained outside. Specifically,
the limits in the north-east corner sought to leave not only the basin of
the St. Lawrence river but sufficient overland to Canada to have access to
Quebec and Montreal; in the north-west, they implied the split of the
former Oregon ‘Country’ with the British, lately included in the Canadian
province of British Columbia; half of California was in, but the other half
was out, in Mexico; Puerto Rico was associated to the Union, while the
much closer Cuba was not. Not to mention territorially disconnected
Alaska and the Pacific archipelagos. Rather than shaped by geography, the
territorial limits of the American Union were established in strong
dependency of the Union’s capability of assimilation and consistent
institutionalization of its components.
2.1.3. The European Union enlargements
Theunion of Europe was initially promoted by themid-twentieth century as a
reaction to increasingly frequent and lethal conflicts, especially around the
expansionist attempts of theGerman empire, having culminated in the Second
World War in 1939-45. Some influential political leaders in the early years
were the Christian-democrats Robert Schuman in France, Alcide de Gasperi
in Italy, KonradAdenauer inGermany, the Social-democrat Paul-Henri Spaak
in Belgium and the Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli. One of the founding
fathers, Jean Monnet, had anticipated the project still during the war, while
being a member of the free French government in exile. He foretold:
“There will be no peace in Europe if the states rebuild themselves
on the basis of national sovereignty, with its implications of prestige
politics and economic protection ... The countries of Europe are
not strong enough individually to be able to guarantee prosperity
and social development for their peoples. The states of Europe
must therefore form a federation or a European entity that would
make them into a common economic unit.”
After the war, and as the most powerful European states began to lose their
rival colonial empires overseas, they began to build a kind of internal,
continental empire among themselves for economicandmilitary cooperation.
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The expansionist policy of the neighboring Soviet Union in Eastern Europe
reinforced the incentives to create a common European defense, in addition
to relying upon the military protection of the United States.
Wars in Europe. The European Union was thus created and has been
successively enlarged in response to intra-European conflicts and in
competition with the Russian empire. In a similar way to the American
case, where the union was developed for reasons of war, mainly as a self-
protecting mechanism from the former colonial power, there were also
strong military reasons for the initial project of building the United States
of Europe.
The union of Europe indeed began as a military enterprise. After the
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led by the
United States in 1949, the European partners created theWestern European
Union. In parallel, a number of international economic agreements among
several European states were conceived as being able to reduce competition
for strategic resources and in this way prevent some important causes of
war. Six states –the large France, Germany, and Italy, and those in the
Benelux area comprising Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg–
created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, as well as
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The three
economic communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) eventually merged into
the European Community, which formed a single Council and a single
Commission in 1967.
Building Europe-wide common institutions required a basic consensus
among its member states on democratic principles. Further expansions
were driven by the aim of establishing durable democracy and aggregating
resources by trade rather than by direct military initiatives, which was
highly successful in preventing the emergence of motives for new inter-
state wars.
Successive enlargements. The initial core of six member-states of the
European Community (EC) was located at the territorial center of the
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continent, largely coinciding with the lands of Charlemagne’s medieval
Empire which later evolved into the Holy Roman and German empire.
The first expansions of the EC were implemented towards the west and the
south. The candidacy of the United Kingdom was initially rejected in 1961,
which implied the withdrawal of its partners in the alternative European
Free Trade Association, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. Nevertheless,
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were accepted as new state-
members of the EC in 1973. Norway remained out after two failed
referendumsformembership, although itbelongs to theEuropeanEconomic
Space forming a common market and it cooperates with the European
institutions on interior and on defense and security policies.
In the South, the joining of Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986
after their democratization provided a guarantee against the re-emergence
of past dictatorships. With these enlargements, the number of member-
states of the European Community doubled to 12 and the initial area (not
counting colonies) was multiplied by two and a half. The western and
southern frontiers of the Union of Europe were then fixed at the Atlantic
ocean and the Mediterranean sea.
After the demise of the Soviet empire and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the European Union expanded north- and east-wards. First,
the EastGerman territory, having formed the so-calledGermanDemocratic
Republic under Soviet vigilance, was annexed to the Federal Republic of
Germany and thus to Europe. Second, the EU incorporated the countries
on its previous frontier with the Soviet Union that had remained ‘neutral’ in
foreign policy, Austria, Finland and Sweden, in 1995.
Later, it expanded towards newly democratizedEasternEuropean territories
that had been members of the German or the Austrian empires in the past
and had been annexed or satellized by the Soviets as a consequence ofWorld
War II. They included three former members of the Soviet Union (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania), the two formermembers of the federation of Czecho-
Slovakia, one former member of the federation of Yugoslavia (Slovenia),
and only four previously independent states (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland
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and Romania), up to ten new members, in 2004-2007. All these countries
also became NATO members. In contrast, other former members of the
Soviet Union with stronger past links with Russia remained outside.
Additionally, two small, recently independent British colonies on islands in
the Mediterranean, Cyprus and Malta, were also incorporated.
2.1.4. Fixing the European borders
With the current 27 member-states, the initial area of the six founding
countries of the EuropeanUnion has beenmultiplied by three.The frontiers
of the Union are now at the Atlantic ocean in the west, the Mediterranean
sea in the south, the Arctic ocean in the north, and near the borders of
Turkey and the Russian empire in the east.
Yet, in the south-east corner, in particular, the limits of the European Union
are still undefined. A number of civil wars broke out in the Balkans in the
process of dissolution of communist-dominated Yugoslavia. The European
members of NATO, together with their American allies participated in
several military actions to deter violent conflicts, including in Bosnia in
1995 and in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, followed by the establishment of
military missions to keep peace in those territories. Official and officially
potential candidates to join the European Union include now all the
territories in the Balkans, as well the remaining former members of
Yugoslavia, that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia, and the international protectorate of Kosovo, to which the enclosed
Albania would be added. Most of these countries, with the notorious
exception of Serbia, have also been invited to join NATO. All
of them already belong to the Stabilization and Association Agreement
giving them access to EU markets and financial support.
More controversial is the candidacy of Turkey, another NATO member,
which is also subjected to scrutiny regarding its civil rights and democratic
credentials. Other possible candidates may include Iceland and Norway,
who are alsoNATOmembers, andSwitzerland,whichdeclinedmembership
in the 1990s on the basis of weak internal social support. With all these 38
or so countries, the European Union would multiply the initial area of the 6
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foundingmember states by four (although it would still amount to less than
two thirds the area of the United States).
As suggested by the previous overview, the external borders and the internal
fullmembership of the territories of the currently ongoing European empire
are not entirely pre-determined by Christendom or by geography. While
the northern, western and to some extent southern borders are relatively
well established, the eastern limits of the Union are still rivalrous with the
neighboring Russian empire, and dubious regarding the relations with
Turkey, the remnant of the Ottoman empire.
A natural eastern border of the EU could be traced around the Black sea
and the basins of its rivers, while Russia would be bounded by the Caspian
sea and the Volga basin. Also, the Baltic sea and most of its river basins
could be a well-defined northern border between Europe and Russia.
However, Russia keeps the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad (built after WWII
on the ruins of the Prussian city of Königsberg), which is encircled by
European Union territory and can be accessed only via lands in Lithuania
and Belarus. Also, although officially the whole of the island of Cyprus
belongs to the EuropeanUnion, about one third of the territory in the north
of the island is a Turkish enclave beyond EU control. In contrast to the
United States, therefore, the European Union still has some ‘frontiers’ to be
settled in a more stable way.
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Figure 2.1 Territorial expansion of the United States
and the European Union
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census and author’s own elaboration.
HOWTHE EU GREW
Foundation
1958
Enlargement
1st. 1973
2nd. 1981
3rd. 1986
4th. 1995
5th. 2004-07
In accession
30 EUROPE, LIKE AMERICA. THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A CONTINENTAL FEDERATION
Figure 2.2 The Holy Roman and German Empire and the founding
members of the European Community
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Source: Adapted fromWilliam Shepherd, Historical Atlas, and author’s own elaboration.
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2.2. The Shape of the States
Delimiting the territories able to be assimilated in an imperial Union is not
sufficient to secure the stability and duration of the new polity. The
institutionalization of all territories under well-integrated and roughly
democratic formulas may take a long period. In the United States, the
director of the census announced the death of the frontier as late as in 1890,
as he observed that there was no longer unexplored wilderness in America
(except for Alaska). By then, once all of the United States territories had
beenannexed, theywereable tobeorganizedas ‘states’with self-government.
For the European Union, in contrast, several frontiers are still open and,
therefore, a complete and stable constitutional formula for the Union has
not yet been established.
2.2.1. The states in the USA
Within the United States, the territorial limits of each state were drawn,
first, on the basis of the former colonies, which in some cases had existed
forup to150 years. Previously existing independent states, such asCalifornia
and Texas and, of course, Hawaii, also have their own shape. For new lands,
however, the criterion was adopted that all states should be created equal in
area. In fact, many of the new states are square in shape, measuring 3 or 4
degrees in height and up to 7 degrees in width.
State borders by design. The population in the original territories upon
independence from Britain (where 25 states eventually formed) is about
half of total current population (52%). Nowadays, the average state in the
AmericanUnionhas an area of 200,000 km2, and about 6million inhabitants
(close to the population of the average independent state in the world,
which is about 7million).The differences, however, are significant: themost
populated state, California, with about 37 million, is seventy times more
populated than the least one, Wyoming, with less than half a million.
The basic territorial limits of the American Union had been fixed by the
mid-19th century, as mentioned, making “a country large enough for a
great empire”, in the words of president James Polk. But at the time of the
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Civil War in 1861, only 34 states were formally organized, out of the 50 to
be established in the future, which encompassed barely half of the territory
(due to the smaller size of the initial former colonies). Eleven of those 34
states, includingabout30percentoftotalpopulation,formedtheConfederate
States of America and proclaimed their secession, while still fighting with
the rest of the Union for some unorganized territories.
After the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865, internal wars with natives and
lawlessnesswere characteristic of the famous ‘WildWest’ for several decades.
Settlers on the frontier established towns and counties, as well as territorial
governments combining a locally elected legislature with a governor and
other officials sent by the federal government. A territory qualified for
statehood if it achieved a population of 60,000. But during the twenty-five
years following the Civil War, federal Congress made a state of only one
territory (Colorado), while territorial governments subsisted for decades.
Statehood implied citizenship rights including those of voting for their own
top officials as well as for the federal president, representatives and senators.
It was not until 1912 that all 48 states covering almost all the territory were
formed (while two more, Alaska and Hawaii, were later added in 1958 and
1959).
Brittle external borders. In spite of the stable formal borders of the United
States, nowadays unincorporated territories still exist in a number of islands
in the Caribbean sea and the Pacific ocean. They have a local government
but no voting rights for federal offices. U.S. citizenship is given to the
inhabitants of the commonwealthsofPuertoRico and theNorthernMariana
Islands, while those in the colonies of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa experience other restrictions. There have also been a few
cases in which some territories have separated from the USA. The Pacific
archipelagos of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau, which were
occupied during WWII by Japan, eventually became independent (the
former two in 1986 and the latter in 1994), while maintaining a Compact of
Free Association with the United States and the use of the U.S. dollar.
Stabilizing the external borders of theUnited States was a necessary condition
for its internal institutionalization and increasing cohesion.However, keeping
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the U.S. borders closed has always been a harsh endeavor. In the north-east,
trans-border state and provincial cooperation has developed between New
England and the Canadian Maritimes. In the north-west, a trans-border
economic region called Cascadia includes Seattle in the USA and Vancouver
in Canada. In the south-west, San Diego in the USA and Tijuana in Mexico
form a single metropolitan area. Large segments of the border with Mexico
have never ceased being crossed by legal and illegal traders, traffickers,
laborers and migrants.
Attracting forces within a larger space than the United States eventually led
to the creation of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in 1989,
and the North America Free Trade Agreement, also including Mexico, five
years later. The development of increasing continental economic relations
has not only reduced the strength of the borders, but has also contributed to
modifying the internal territorial balance within each country. In Canada,
demands for further self-government and independence of Quebec have
been facilitated by the expectation that, with better access to the United
States markets, it would have economic alternatives and a wider range of
options regarding the rest of Canada. In Mexico, some northern lands,
thanks to their proximity to the United States, have experienced significant
economic growth, while the south remains in poverty and the regional
inequalities within the country increase.
2.2.2. The states in the EU
The territorial limits of most state-members of the European Union were
drawn prior to their membership of the Union. However, most of these
states and their borders are of relatively recent conformation. Of the 27
states, 8 are less than 50 years old, 12 are less than 100 years old, and in total
20 are less than 200 years old, most of them having been created as a result
of the desegregation of parts of the Austrian, German, British, Ottoman
and Russian empires, as well as the Czechoslovak and Yugoslavian
federations. All in all, most states of the EU are about as young as most
states of the USA. Only 7 European member-states have more remote
origins in previous large empires: Denmark, France, Britain, Spain, Sweden,
the Netherlands, and Portugal.
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States and regions. The average area of an EU member-state is 150,000
km2. The population of the initial six member-states is almost half of total
population (47%). These magnitudes are comparable to the corresponding
measurements of the states sizes in the United States. However, the average
European state nowadays has a population of more than 18 million
inhabitants, in contrast to about 6 million for the states in the United States,
as mentioned. The differences are huge: the most populated country,
Germany,withmore than80millions, is two-hundred timesmorepopulated
than the smallest, Malta, with less than half a million inhabitants.
The size of the largest European states and the differences between states are
somehow reduced by internal decentralization and the strength of regional
governments.There are 74 regionswith elected governments and assemblies
with legislative powers within seven of the largest states in EU (and 107 if
non-legislative elected regional assemblies are also counted), which,
together with the mostly medium- and small-sized twenty unitary states,
would produce an average of about 5.3 million inhabitants per political unit
–a similar size to the average state within the USA and also close to the
average independent state in the world, as mentioned.
The development of increasing continental integrationmodifies old internal
territorial balances within member-states. As the broader external borders
of the European Union tend to consolidate, the narrower internal borders
between and within its state-members tend to fade.
Only Germany and Austria, which had formed the two largest empires in
Central Europe, were organized as federations upon joining the European
Union. But further processes of decentralization in favor of regional
governments took place later in Belgium and developed in Italy since the
1970s, in Spain and France (the latter without legislative powers) since the
1980s, in the United Kingdom since the 1990s, and in Poland since the
2000s. These processes grow at different paces and with different formulas,
but all benefit from the incentives and opportunities for alternative inter-
territorial relations provided by membership of the European Union and
always move in the direction of increasing decentralization. They are also
asymmetric, with some outstanding regions making stronger claims for
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higher self-government and having special institutional formulas, as in the
cases of Bavaria, Flanders, Lombardy, Friuli, Sicily, Basque country,
Catalonia, Corsica, Northern Ireland, Scotland and others.
Inter-territorial cooperation also develops across state borders, leading to
the formation of European Commission-sponsored euro-regions. As inter-
state borders vanish, neighboring regions within different states tend to
coordinate common interests. Currently 61 euro-regions exist, mostly
located in the Benelux area, across the German borders with Austria,
Czechia and Poland, and across the Scandinavian countries. Also, while
some microstates are members of the European Union, as is the case of
Luxembourg andMalta, others that are not members have special relations,
including the use of the euro and open borders with their neighbors, as is
the case of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican.
Imperial external borders. The European Union formally established in
1993 that the conditions for previously existing states to join are the disposal
of stable institutions that guarantee democracy and the rule of law, a
functioning economy which can cope with the large markets of the Union,
as well as the ability to assume the obligations of membership and put EU
rules and procedures into effect. Strengthening the union has indeed led to
maintaining and establishing democratic institutions across the continent
and in potential new candidates to join. However, the actual fulfillment of
these conditions is somewhat uneven. A number of diverse formulas have
existed and exist in the territories encompassed by the European Union.
First, many European colonies in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean obtained
independence after their metropolis had created the European Community.
These included, for the British empire, Belize, Brunei, Hong Kong, Maldives,
St Kitts and Nevis; for the French empire, Algeria, Djibouti, Vanuatu; for the
Danish empire, Greenland and Faeroe; for the Dutch empire, Guiana
(becoming Suriname); for the Portuguese empire, Macau; for the Belgian
empire, Congo; and for the Italian empire, Somalia. The colonies of
member-states that remain today are not part of the European Union, but
they enjoy ‘association’ agreements, as is the case of the British dominions in
the islands of Anguilla, Bermudas, Cayman, Falkland, Montserrat, Pitcairn,
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StHelena,Turks&Caicos, andVirgin, theFrenchdominionsof StBarthélemy
and St Martin, and the Dutch dominions in Aruba and Antilles.
The so-called ‘outermost regions’ and other special cases are mostly other
islands with colonial origins whose inhabitants, in contrast to those of the
above mentioned colonies, are EU citizens, but they enjoy special tax
exemptions.They include, for Britain, the bailiwicks in the Channel islands,
Man and the enclave of Gibraltar; for France, the departments of Guiana,
Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion, as well as the ‘collectivities’ of New
Caledonia, Mayotte, St Pierre &Miquelon, Polynesia, andWallis & Futuna;
for Spain, the autonomous community of the Canary Islands and the
autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla; for Portugal, the autonomous
regions of Azores and Madeira; for Greece, the Mount Athos; and for
Finland, the autonomous province of Åland. (A few of them appear, in spite
of their remoteness, on the map of Europe on euro bills).
Worried by the huge economic inequalities and cultural differences between
most European Union member-states and most of the surrounding
countries, EU leaders maintain a ‘Neighborhood Policy’ including support
economic programs and concerns regarding mass migration. On the east,
the Russian area of influence extends to several former Soviet republics,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan in
the SouthCaucasus. Of these, Ukraine andGeorgia, in particular, are deeply
divided societies. Democratizing movements, the so-called ‘orange’ and
‘rose’ revolutions, developed in these countries in 2004, but the population
has remained split betweenpro-European andpro-Russian segments.While
these countries have been invited to join NATO and offered free trade deals
by the EU, Russia has demonstrated its interest and strength by intervening
militarily in Georgia and threatening the European Union with temporarily
cutting its provision of gas through Ukraine.
Beyond the established limits of the EU, the so-called ‘Barcelona process’
also seeks to build an area of peace and security through the Union for the
Mediterranean, which includes the Arab countries of Northern Africa
and the Middle East. But the European Union is not trying to enlarge itself
with any of those countries. In fact, Morocco’s bid for membership was
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rejected in 1987. The EU is only trying to guard its southern frontier as a
stable border.
2.2.3. Appendix
Figure 2.3 States in America and Europe
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATES POPULATION
Alabama 4,661,900
Alaska 686,293
Arizona 6,500,180
Arkansas 2,855,390
California 36,756,666
Colorado 4,939,456
Connecticut 3,501,252
Delaware 873,092
D. Columbia 591,833
Florida 18,328,340
Georgia 9,685,744
Hawaii 1,288,198
Idaho 1,523,816
Illinois 12,901,563
Indiana 6,376,792
Iowa 3,002,555
Kansas 2,802,134
Kentucky 4,269,245
Louisiana 4,410,796
Maine 1,316,456
Maryland 5,633,597
Massachusetts 6,497,967
Michigan 10,003,422
Minnesota 5,220,393
Mississippi 2,938,618
Missouri 5,911,605
Montana 967,440
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATES POPULATION
Nebraska 1,783,432
Nevada 2,600,167
New Hampshire 1,315,809
New Jersey 8,682,661
NewMexico 1,984,356
NewYork 19,490,297
North Carolina 9,222,414
North Dakota 641,481
Ohio 11,485,910
Oklahoma 3,642,361
Oregon 3,790,060
Pennsylvania 12,448,279
Rhode Island 1,050,788
South Carolina 4,479,800
South Dakota 804,194
Tennessee 6,214,888
Texas 24,326,974
Utah 2,736,424
Vermont 621,270
Virginia 7,769,089
Washington 6,549,224
West Virginia 1,814,468
Wisconsin 5,627,967
Wyoming 532,668
Average 5,961,955
Total 304,059,724
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UNITED STATES OF EUROPA
STATES POPULATION
Average (27) 18,424,260
Total (27) 497,455,033
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE
& EU CANDIDATES
Serbia 7,379,339
Bosnia 4,613,414
Croatia 4,489,409
Macedonia 2,066,718
Kosovo 1,804,838
Montenegro 672,180
Albania 3,639,453
Iceland 306,694
Norway 4,660,539
Switzerland 7,604,467
Average (37) 14,451,137
Total (37) 534,692,084
Sources: U. S. Census Bureau 2009, United Nations 2009.
UNITED STATES OF EUROPA
STATES POPULATION
Austria 8,331,930
Belgium 10,666,866
Bulgaria 7,640,238
Cyprus 789,258
Czech Republic 10,381,130
Denmark 5,475,791
Estonia 1,340,935
Finland 5,300,484
France 63,753,140
Germany 82,217,837
Greece 11,213,785
Hungary 10,045,401
Ireland 4,401,335
Italy 59,619,290
Latvia 2,270,894
Lithuania 3,366,357
Luxembourg 483,799
Malta 410,290
Netherlands 16,405,399
Poland 38,115,641
Portugal 10,617,575
Romania 21,528,627
Slovakia 5,400,998
Slovenia 2,025,866
Spain 45,283,259
Sweden 9,182,927
United Kingdom 61,185,981
40 EUROPE, LIKE AMERICA. THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A CONTINENTAL FEDERATION
Figure 2.4 Regions in the European Union
Austria 8,032,900
Burgenland 281,300
Carinthia 561,200
Lower Austria 1,597,600
Upper Austria 1,408,700
Salzburg 530,700
Styria 1,206,300
Tyrol 703,600
Vorarlberg 366,500
Vienna 1,678,400
Belgium 10,656,368
Brussels 1,080,790
Flanders 6,161,600
Wallonia 3,413,978
France 63,753,140
Alsace 1,815,493
Aquitaine 3,119,778
Auvergne 1,335,938
Bourgogne 1,628,837
Bretagne 3,094,534
Centre 2,519,567
Champagne-Ardenne 1,338,850
Corsica 294,118
Franche-Comté 1,150,624
Île-de-France 11,532,398
Languedoc-Roussillon 2,534,144
Limousine 730,920
Lorraine 2,335,694
Midi-Pyrénées 2,776,822
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 4,018,644
Basse-Normandie 1,456,793
Haute-Normandie 1,811,055
Pays de la Loire 3,450,329
Picardie 1,894,355
Poitou-Charentes 1,724,123
Provence-Côte d’Azur 4,815,232
Rhône-Alpes 6,021,293
Germany 82,217,837
Baden-Württemberg 10,749,755
Bavaria 12,520,332
Berlin 3,416,255
Brandenburg 2,535,737
Bremen 663,082
Hamburg 1,770,629
Hessen 6,072,555
Lower Saxony 7,971,684
N. Rhine-Westphalia 17,996,621
Rhineland-Palatinate 4,045,643
Saarland 1,036,598
Saxony 4,220,200
Saxony-Anhalt 2,412,472
Schleswig-Holstein 2,837,373
Thuringia 2,289,219
Western Pomerania 1,679,682
Italy 59,619,290
Piedmont 4,401,266
Valle D’Aosta 125,979
Lombardy 9,642,406
Liguria 1,609,822
Trentino Alto Adige 1,007,267
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Portugal 10,617,575
Portugal mainland 10,128,751
Azores 245,806
Madeira 243,018
Spain 46,008,985
Andalucía 8,202,220
Aragon 1,326,918
Asturias 1,080,138
Balearic Islands 1,072,844
Basque Country 2,157,112
Canary Islands 2,075,968
Cantabria 582,138
Castile and León 2,557,330
Castile-La Mancha 2,043,100
Catalonia 7,364,078
Extremadura 1,097,744
Galicia 2,784,169
Madrid 6,271,638
Murcia 1,426,109
Navarre 620,377
Rioja 317,501
Valencia 5,029,601
United Kingdom 61,185,981
England 51,092,000
Scotland 5,144,200
Wales 2,980,000
Northern Ireland 1,759,100
Average 3,968,058
Veneto 4,832,340
Friuli Venetia Giulia 1,222,061
Emilia Romagna 4,275,802
Toscana 3,677,048
Umbria 884,450
Marche 1,553,063
Lazio 5,561,017
Abruzzi 1,323,987
Molise 320,838
Campania 5,811,390
Puglia 4,076,546
Basilicata 591,001
Calabria 2,007,707
Sicily 5,029,683
Sardinia 1,665,617
Poland 38,115,909
Dolnoslaskie 2,876,832
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 2,066,418
Lodzkie 2,551,633
Lubelskie 2,163,437
Lubuskie 1,008,656
Malopolskie 3,282,378
Mazowieckie 5,195,000
Opolskie 1,034,656
Podkarpackie 2,097,276
Podlaskie 1,191,925
Pomorskie 2,215,100
Slaskie 4,648,961
Swietokrzyskie 1,273,625
Warminsko-Mazurskie 1,426,401
Wielkopolskie 3,391,256
Zachodniopomorskie 1,692,355
Source: Author’s own elaboration. See Colomer,Great Empires, Small Nations. London: Routledge, 2007.
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III. Designing Institutions
With the establishment of external limits and borders control, a new Union
candevelop some internal institutionalization, even if it is largely introduced
‘from above’ in conditions of initially deficient democracy. With well-
defined institutional rules for decision-making, the new union should attain
higher ‘loyalty’ of its citizens, which is a favorable condition for institutional
stability and Union-wide policy making.
As will be presented in the following pages, both the United States of
America and the European Union institutional frameworks are based on
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ divisions of powers between differently elected or
appointed institutions. A ‘vertical’ division of powers implies distribution
of competences among governments at different levels, including local-,
state- and union-wide levels. States’ rights in the USA and the principle of
subsidiarity in the EU have been proposed as guides for the distribution of
powers among a ‘vertical’ set of government levels. However, in both cases
some fluctuations in the relative power of the union, the states and the
regions or counties can be identified over time.
A ‘horizontal’ division of legislative, executive and judicial central powers
fosters both cooperative and conflictive relations between different bodies
elected or appointed by different ways. In none of the new constitutional
arrangements a single institution holding ‘sovereignty’ or the power tomake
the ultimate decision can be identified. In both the US and the EU the
federal compromise implies two legislative chambers, respectively
representing the population of the union at large and its member states. But
there are significant differences between the two institutional frameworks.
In the US the division of powers in the center focuses on the relations
between the bicameral legislative Congress (House of Representatives and
Senate) and the executive Presidency. In the EU, it includes also a bicameral
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legislature (Parliament and Council of Ministers), but a dual executive, the
European Council and the Commission, each with its Presidency. In both
cases, however, most decisions must be made with the consensual support
of broad political majorities.
In the United States it took a long period to establish in practice a real
system of mutual ‘checks and balances’ among institutions, which were not
clearly shaped until the early twentieth century. In the European Union the
enforcement of some basic new rules recently approved is not yet
complete.
3.1. Two Constitutional Conventions
Constitutions for both the United States of America and the European
Union were drafted in Conventions especially called for the purpose. In
both cases, the constitution-makers focused on the federative characteristics
of the union and designed complex structures of division of powers and
inter-institutionalrelations,incontrasttoformulaswithhigherconcentration
of power typical of nation-states.
Some important differences between the two cases, however, exist. For the
United States, the constitutional Convention that gathered in Philadelphia
at the end of the eighteenth century was the beginning of the Union. In
Europe, in contrast, a constitutional convention was assembled in Brussels
at the beginning of the twenty-first century after a few decades of increasing
union and a number of accumulated constitutional-like treaties. While the
new institutions of the American union were created from scratch, at the
time of opening the Brussels convention the European Union had a more
constraining previous institutional structure, which led the discussion
towards adaptive reforms of the already existing framework.
InboththeAmericanandtheEuropeanConventions,acontroversydeveloped
between those in favor of a stronger, federal union and those preferring to
maintain only loose, intergovernmental relations or a confederative link. But
while the American delegates came from independent states that were just
temporarily linked in a confederacy for reasons of self-defense and war, the
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decisive participants in the European convention represented member-states
of the European Union with stronger legal and material links among them.
Accordingly, some leaders of independent states in America could credibly
threat with not joining the Union or even with seeking new international
allies, as actually some delegates did in Philadelphia. In contrast, the costs of
leaving the Union were higher for the European participants.
Thus, in America, the small states’ delegates became partners of the initial
winning coalition in the Convention because without them the project of a
unionmighthave failedand therewouldnothaveprobablybeenconstitution
at all. They achieved to preserve important states’ rights out of the new
federal jurisdiction and also obtained some over-representation in the federal
institutional framework. In Europe, in contrast, where the potential threats
of the small states with leaving were less credible, the larger states were able
to prevail more clearly on most important institutional choices.
3.1.1. The United States in Philadelphia
After having declared their independence from Britain and fought against
the imperial troops, the initial Confederation of North American states
adopted a new constitution which would create the federation of the United
States of America. The constitutional Convention gathered in Philadelphia
fromMay to September, 1787, after an initiative of the Virginia Legislature,
following James Madison’s recommendation. It was formed by 55 delegates
of 12 of the 13 states (Rhode Island being absent). The result of the
Convention was the United States Constitution, which was adopted “in
order to form a more perfect Union”.
The constitution had to be ratified by most states’ conventions within a few
months. However, the ratification campaign was not easy. In Rhode Island
and North Carolina the constitution was initially refused, by popular
referendum and by the state convention respectively. Only new conventions
in these states ratified the constitution after the first United States president
and Congress had been elected and ten constitutional amendments had
been approved, mostly to satisfy those two and other states’ demands. The
ten amendments, which were commonly known as the ‘Bill of Rights’,
acknowledged basic individual rights and the rule of law.
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The United States constitution is very brief, structured in 7 articles with
only about 4,400 words, and with the 27 amendments which have been
approved so far, less than 8,000 words in total. It is basically centered in the
institutional design of the Union. From the beginning, the framers of the
U.S. constitution clearly established that a federal arrangement required a
two-chamber Congress. As was finally agreed upon, the members of the
House of Representatives would be apportioned among “the several states
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
numbers [of inhabitants]”. In contrast, the Senate would have equal number
of seats per state, regardless population, to be filled by the state
legislatures.
Parliamentary or presidential? The form of government to be adopted by
the new, large polity was intensely discussed. Three basic proposals were
presented in the Convention. First, there was the proposal of parliamentary
regime, by which the chief-executive would be elected by Congress, as
included in the initial federalist plan elaborated by delegates from Virginia.
This proposal was congruent with the way most states in the Confederation
were organized, since in 8 out of 13 states the governor was elected by the
legislature. However, most of those state legislatures, which were elected with
rather primitive and rude rules andmethods, were vulnerable to criticisms of
inefficiency and demagoguery. The federal parliamentary proposal was open
to similar criticisms as it would be based on a new Congress likely elected
with similar manners. This gave leverage to the defenders of separation of
powers between the legislative and the executive.Theparliamentary proposal,
as it implied the creation of a new federal government, was also resisted by the
defenders of the founding states’ powers.
The second proposal, which can be mainly associated to republicans from
Pennsylvania, was direct election of the president by the people in order to
establishaneat separationofpowers fromCongress.Thisproposal coincided
with the parliamentary one in its aim to create a strong central government.
But it was particularly disadvantageous to the small states, whose influence
in the direct presidential election would have been minor, as well as to the
South, where voting rights were allocated to significantly lower proportions
of the population than in the North.
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Finally, the small states proposed the executive to be appointed by the state
governments. This proposal for the presidential election was supported by
a few participants in the Convention, but they were determined in their
position because their political existence depended in some sense on the
consolidation of the states’ powers. As mentioned, it can be assumed that
without the support of a few, even if small states, the constitutional
convention would not have been able to attain a successful outcome, since
membership to the new Union was still undefined.
The Convention voted in favor of different formulas during the process
of elaborating, discussing, revising and approving proposals in a series of
committees. The parliamentary proposal was approved initially and on two
more occasions. Opposition to parliamentarism, however, developed
strongly, especially using the argument that the choice of president by
a numerous assembly would be the occasion of “intrigue”, “cabal
and corruption”.This didn’tmean in practicemuchmore than the formation
of congressional multi-party majority coalitions, which is typical of
parliamentary regimes, but this experience was alien to the American
constituents of the time.
The crucial move was that the republicans in favor of separate powers
lowered their support to their own formula of direct presidential election
–aided by some fears of people’s ignorance andmanipulability–. Apparently
led by the maneuvering skills of delegate Gouverneur Morris from
Pennsylvania, they formed a coalition with the small states’ delegates.
During the last few days of the Convention, the matter was referred to a
committee from which a new invention emerged, able to reunite all those
opposed to parliamentarism.
The new formula of indirect election was based on an electoral College
formed by electors who would typically be committed to vote for a certain
candidate for president. The electors were to be chosen in each state in a
number equal to the sum of federal representatives and senators from the
state –so giving the small states some overrepresentation due to the equal
number of senators per state–. This implied that the election of president
would be separated from Congress, as wanted by the republicans, while its
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specific procedure would give the small states likely high influence in the
decision.
Nevertheless, it was also established that in case that no candidate obtained
a majority support of electors in the College, the choice of president would
be transferred to theHouse of Representatives, as in a parliamentary regime,
which was also acceptable to the Virginians and allies. The House would
choose on the basis of one vote per state (to be decided by majority of each
state’s representatives), thus giving the smaller states very high
overrepresentation. Apparently, the widest expectation at the time was that
there would be a proliferation of state’s favorite sons as presidential
candidates and, as a consequence, usually no majority would be formed in
the College. The House would choose the president by forming a coalition
of a majority of states, independently on their size. Actually, the first five
presidents of the United States were nominated as candidates by
congressional caucuses among leading members of the independence
process (Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe), implying
thus some degree of “intrigue”. The sixth (Adams’ son), lacking a majority
in the College, was appointed by the House of Representatives in spite of
having been second in both popular votes and College electors, in 1824.
Yet, some political leaders from large states soon realized that it was in their
advantage to unite around presidential candidates able to obtain broad
support and win in the College rather than to have to negotiate with small
states in the House. Although an absolute majority was required in the
College, the president of the United States could be elected with the support
of only simple pluralities in a few large states. The College became, in
general, a rubber stamp of the outcome of those elections.
All in all, the United States constitution established the rules for a new
federation, to be effectively built and institutionalized during the following
decades.Themost characteristic institutional feature of theU.S. constitution
was the introduction of separate elections and divisions of powers between
the presidency and the two chambers of Congress. Although it initially gave
some leverage to the small states, actually the larger states eventually tended
to prevail in institutional decision-making.
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3.1.2. The European Union in Brussels
The accumulation of constitutional-type rules in the European Union has
been the result of a long-term endeavor for institutional design. The main
elements in the process have been these: the Treaty of Rome, establishing
the European Economic Community and the prospect of “an ever closer
union” (1957); the Merger Treaty of the Coal and Steel, the Economic, and
the Atomic Energy Communities, which created a Single European
Commission and a Single Council (1965); the Single European Act to
achieve an internal common market (1987); the Treaty of Maastricht
establishing the European Union with additional ‘pillars’ in defense and in
justice and home affairs (1992); the Treaty of Amsterdam establishing basic
principles for membership and future enlargements (1997); the Treaty of
Nice reforming the institutions (2001); and the treaty “establishing a
constitution for Europe” (2004), which was never ratified and was partly
replaced with the Treaty of Lisbon. The latter was agreed in 2007 and has
been in force since December 2009.
A European Convention gathered in Brussels from February 2002 to July
2003, chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, in the
intention tomerge all the former treaties anddesign efficient anddemocratic
formulas for the governance of the European Union. The Convention was
formed by 105 members, mostly from state parliaments of the 15 member-
states and 13 candidate countries (including Turkey), at 3 members per
state, plus a few members of the European Parliament and two from the
European Commission. The project was submitted and somewhat revised
at an Inter-Governmental Conference formed only by representatives of the
state governments from October 2003 to June 2004. As a result, a “Treaty
establishing a constitution for Europe” was signed by the heads of State and
Government in October 2004.
The European constitution should have been ratified by all state members,
but it was soon refused by popular referendums in France and the
Netherlands. A new Inter-Governmental Conference replaced the failed
text with a new Reform Treaty, also called of Lisbon, in December 2007. It
adoptedmost innovations of the constitution, but it was presented as amere
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amendment of the former treaties of Rome andMaastricht to prevent a new
complicatedprocedure.Nevertheless, this treaty failed again at being ratified
according to the planned schedule, since it was rejected by popular
referendum in Ireland in June 2008. A new referendum in Ireland finally
approved the Lisbon Treaty in October 2009.
The original text of the European Union constitution was extremely long,
with almost 100,000 words. In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the
European one did not deal only with institutional matters, but it also
contained the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (which is roughly equivalent
to an enlarged version of the American Bill of Rights) and was largely
devoted to “the policies and functioning of the Union”.The Treaty of Lisbon
has about half that length.
Parliamentary or presidential? Regarding the form of government of the
EuropeanUnion, three basic proposals were expressed during the European
constitutional Convention. First, there was the proposal of parliamentary
regime, bywhich the chief-executivewould be the president of the European
Commission elected by the European Parliament. This proposal was
promoted by the parliamentarians of federal parliamentary Germany and
the small and peripheral states, and was backed by some federalist members
of the European Parliament and the observers from the Committee of the
Regions. This proposal was congruent with the way most states in Europe
are organized, since the state’s chief executive (prime minister, chancellor,
president of the council of ministers or president of the government) is
elected by parliament in 22 out of 27 member-states.
Consistently, this proposal implied a politically weak, rather ceremonial
chair of the European Council, which was just an unregulated meeting of
the heads of government or state with the presidents of the Commission
and the Parliament. Since its creation in the 1970s, the chair of the European
Council had been appointed in rotation among all its members for a period
of only six months; with 27 member-states, each state would expect thus to
be chairing only once every 13.5 years. This was also consistent with the
non-executive, symbolic character of chiefs of state in most European
countries, whether parliamentary monarchs or presidents of republic.
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However, directly elected presidents have significant powers and form dual
executives with the prime minister in five countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus,
France, Lithuania and Poland. The European Council, although deprived
from formal decision power, had been an important agenda setter and,
among other initiatives, had set the conditions and the timetable for
accepting new EU’s members and associates. Many of its members, that is,
the states’ chief executives wished to institutionalize its actual powers.
Thus, the second proposal was more presidentialist. It was promoted by
Giscard, who before chairing the Convention had been president of France
and the actual creator of the European Council, and supported by the
directly elected presidents of France andPoland and the powerful presidents
of government of other large states, namely Italy and Spain (as well as
Turkey). This proposal envisaged the figure of a president of the European
Union, which would be appointed by the European Council, with a long
tenure of 2.5 years renewable once up to 5 years. InGiscard’s initial proposal,
the ‘president’ in French (‘chairman’ in the English version) was called the
“highest authority of theUnion”, there would be a vice-president, a powerful
‘Board’ actually equivalent to a presidential cabinet, and an annual
presidential speech to the Parliament on the state of the union. Some
rhetorical inspiration in theUnited States formulawas transparent, although
the specific formulas were closer to the kind of semi-presidential regime
existing in France and the other few countries mentioned above. No direct
election was, however, proposed. The presidential ‘electoral college’ would
be formed in this case by just states’ chief executives, although Giscard
speculated with a possible ‘Congress’ mixing them with European
parliamentarians. Consistently, the president of the Commission would
become a secondary, subordinate figure, to be appointed by and made
responsible to both the Parliament and the European Council.
Finally, most parliamentarians from Britain and some from a few other
peripheral states were reluctant to any innovation that could strengthen
central powers of federal type. They pressured for maintaining
intergovernmental or inter-state relations rather than creating more
structured institutions.
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TheConvention considered several formulas at different stages.The turning
point was the Franco-German agreement on January 2003 by which
Germany accepted a long-term president for the European Council in
return for France backing a Commission president elected by the European
Parliament. In order to limit the Council president’s powers, and in contrast
to Giscard’s initial proposal, it was agreed upon that that president would
not have vice-president or cabinet. At the same time, the president of the
Commission would be elected by the European Parliament “taking into
account the elections” for a period of 5 years. This dual executive would be
complemented by a ‘double-hatted’ High Representative of the EU for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appointed by both the Council and the
Commission, member of both and Vice-president of the Commission.
In face to this broad agreement, the British representatives, who were too
weak to deter all substantial institutional innovations and wary about
leaving completely the Union (although they are already out of the currency
and security agreements), focused on limiting further the powers of the
Europe-wide institutions. In particular, they attained to maintain defense
andforeignpolicy, taxesandsocial securityasareas inwhichonlyunanimous
decisions could be made, thus giving veto power to individual states on
these areas.
On their side, the small and peripheral state-members, feeling to be demoted
by the enhanced role of the European Council to be dominated by the big
states, asked then for a broad Commission including members of all states,
although a high number of commissioners could diminish its effectiveness at
decision-making.Actually, harshnegotiationsdeveloped to reviseormaintain
the distribution of seats among states in each of the main institutions, that is,
the Parliament, theCommission and theCouncil ofMinisters. New formulas,
after all, were delayed in their enforcement until 2017.
All in all, the European Union has shown some will to shape a stable
institutional structure beyond the relations that are characteristic of
intergovernmental organizations. The institutional formulas adopted for
the federal center lie somehow in between the ‘presidential’ or ’checks and
balances’ regime of the United States and the parliamentary regime typical
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of most European states. The European Union semi-parliamentary regime
includes both a Presidency of the Union and a Commission or government
dependent on the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. The main
difference with other semi-parliamentary regimes, such as France, is that
the president of the Union is not popularly elected, but nominated by the
states’ chief executives gathered together in the European Council. Some
concernshavealsobeenexpressedregardingthenecessary inter-institutional
cooperation for effective decision-making. As it was expressed by Giuliano
Amato, vice-president of the European constitutional Convention, on the
last day of their work, “I have defended the two-headed Europe, but no
animal can live with two heads for too long.”
Nevertheless, Europe is not yet a federation, but can be considered to be still
an ‘empire’ with not only unbounded territorial limits, but also different
degrees of allegiance of member-states and territories to Union-level
processes of decision-making. The option for every state of remaining out
of some common commitments and the emphasis on the possibility of
“enhanced cooperation” among a small group of members demonstrates
that no complete institutional consistency and decision-making cohesion
has been attained yet.
3.2. Federalism
Both the states in North America having proclaimed their independence
and the states in Europe which have formed the Union had affirmed their
original ‘sovereignty’. The notion of territorial sovereignty of each state
implied adoctrine of both internalmonopoly of power andnon-interference
in the affairs of other states. But building a continent-wide empire and
federation implied renouncing the self-assured states’ right to make final
decisions on all the issues in favor of some distribution of powers among
multiple levels of government, each with different responsibilities.
Actually, the efficient organization of most political communities in order
to be able to enforce collective decisions may require multiple levels of
government of different sizes. There are different efficient territorial scales
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for the provision of security against powerful external enemies, laws
permitting free trade and a common currency, broad transport routes such
as roads and highways, the protection of natural parks, the management of
rivers waters, the administration of civil law and justice, services such as
garbage removal, schools, libraries or museums. Each unit of government
and administrationmay have an efficient size and specific responsibilities to
deal with different policy issues and public goods. In an ideal world, each
publicgoodcouldbeprovidedbya specificgovernmental andadministrative
unit encompassing the territory of its efficient scale, be able to have elected
and accountable rulers, and be financed by taxes and other resources
collected from the citizens that would benefit from its provision. With
differentiated territorial scales for each public good, benefits and costs
would be clearly identified and negative externalities would be reduced to
minimum levels. In reality, democratic self-government and the provision
of public goods at different scales have been made compatible through the
unionofsmall territorialgovernments ina large federal structure.Federalism
is just the technique to achieve, simultaneously, the advantages of several
scales of public services and democratic government.
This is an idea that developed already during the foundational building of
the United States of America.Thomas Jefferson, in particular, addressed the
issue in these terms:
“Small wards and townships… have proved themselves the wisest
invention ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise
of self-government, and for its preservation. We should thus
marshal our government into:
1) the general federal republic, for all concerns foreign and
federal;
2) that of the state, for what relates to our own citizens
exclusively;
3) the county republics, for the duties and concerns of the county;
and
4) the ward republics, for the small, and yet numerous and
interesting concerns of the neighborhood.
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In government, as well as in every other business of life, it is by
division and subdivision of duties alone, that all matters, great
and small, can be managed to perfection.”
(Letter to Sam Kercheval, 1816)
This four-fold American basic division would correspond in Europe to 1)
the European Union, 2) the state), 2) the regions) and 4) the municipalities,
including cities and communes. However, in spite of the clarity of the
principle, the specific divisions of powers between different levels of
government which were established by both the United States constitution
and the treaties of the European Union brought about a number of conflicts
of competences, especially between the expanding federal government and
the states’ entrenched traditional powers. In the United States, the main
institutional arbiter between the federal government and the states’
governments was the federal Senate appointed by the states during the
nineteenth century and, since the Senate was homogeneously elected by
direct elections in all states from the early twentieth century on, by the
Supreme Court. In Europe, the conflicts of competences between federal
and states’ have been increasingly arbitrated by the European Court of
Justice.
3.2.1. American states’ rights
TheAmericanexperimentofbuildinganewvery largedemocratic federation
implied a rupture with the limited menu of forms of government on offer at
the time. First, republic or democracy had traditionally been associated to
small cities or communes, as was the case at the time of Venice, the Swiss
cantons or the Dutch provinces, as also were many of the British colonies in
North America when declared independence. When they formed a
Confederation to fight the colonial power, in the aim of preserving the
possibility of democracy they established that “Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence”. The Confederacy included an
assembly in which each state had one vote, as in any diplomatic or
‘intergovernmental’ organization.
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Later on, they approved a federal constitution forming the United States
which was very innovative regarding the possibility of democratic
government in a very large unit. The constitution suggests that there are no
citizens of the United States by itself, but only people with dual citizenship
in the Union and in a state. Taking into account that also new states were
going to be created, it was also established that:
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
republican form of government”.
But the new constitution had to be amended with the so-called Bill of
Rights, as mentioned, to be ratified by states assemblies. The Tenth
Amendment contained in the Bill asserts:
“Thepowersnotdelegated to theUnitedStatesby theConstitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”
For a very long period, the division of powers in the American system
implied that the federal government had received competences on foreign
affairs and defense, as well as on external tariffs, immigration and the
common currency. The states’ governments, on their side, remained
competent onmost domestic issues, including those related to the economy
(natural resources, property, inheritance, commerce, banking and credit,
labor and corporations, public works), social affairs (family, morals, public
health), as well as judiciary and criminal procedures, electoral laws and
local government regulations.
However, the so-called ‘elastic clause’ opened thedoor to further enlargements
of federal powers. As established in the Constitution:
“The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.”
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During an initial period, sustained attempts of federal expansion were
responded by attempts of secession by different states, thus showing higher
levels of citizens’ attachment to the states than to the newUnion. At theWar
against Britain, Connecticut virtually seceded. Five states in northeast
New England voiced opposition to restrictions on foreign trade and to
war presidential powers and formed a convention in 1814 to threaten
secession from the Union. Some years later, as the federal Congress passed
protective tariffs for the northern states in 1828 and 1832, it was the
agricultural and export-oriented Southern states, led by South Carolina and
soon joined by Georgia that “nullified” federal decisions within the state
borders, only to be militarily imposed by the presidency. Maine also split
from New Hampshire on the occasion of the so-called Missouri
compromise.
Later, as is well known, the issue of slavery became the occasion of harsh
polarization which led to the secession of eleven states in the South and
triggered the Civil War in 1861-65. This war was one of the most lethal in
history, with an estimated 620,000 deaths, that is, about 2% of total
population and a higher number than the total American fatalities in the
revolution, the independence, the Mexican and the Spanish-American
wars, World War I, World War II, and the Korean war combined.
Interestingly, both the proslavery groups in the South as the antislavery
ones in the north invoked states’ rights regarding the regulation of property
of slaves and of freed or runaway slaves in their respective territories.
Actually,West Virginia split fromVirginia during theWar. After the further
Reconstruction period, the previous situation was somehow reestablished
regarding the division of powers between the federal and the states’
governments. Although slavery was abolished, several Supreme Court
sentences in the 1880s and1890s introduced the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine
legalizing racial segregation in the South.
Actually, most law experienced by the citizens of the United States consists
primarily of state law, which can and does vary greatly from one state to the
next. Federal law originated with the Constitution, which gives Congress
the power to enact statutes for certain limited purposes. Many statutes give
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executive branch agencies the power to create federal regulations which are
also directly enforceable. In the beginning, federal law traditionally focused
onareaswhere therewas anexpress grantofpower to the federal government
in the Constitution, like the military, foreign affairs, tariffs and currency. A
more clear turn in favor of the federal government was enforced since the
beginning of the twentieth century. Federal law expanded into areas like
transports and communications. A permanent federal income tax was
implemented, through a new constitutional amendment, since 1913. The
so-called New Deal policies promoted by president Franklin D. Roosevelt
since 1933 included new federal regulations on labor relations and social
security, as well as federal subsidies to farmers and other well-controlled
governmental grants. Roosevelt consolidated most expansions of federal
powers by bypassing states’ legislatures and governments and relying on
political party machines at city level, as well as by threatening and coercing
the justices of the Supreme Court. In the 1960s, racial segregation in
Southern states was also curbed by federal laws implying a new balance of
power in favor of the government in Washington.
On a pendulant movement, a gradual return of power to the states was
visible since the early 1980s with the so-called ‘devolution revolution’
and the ‘new federalism’ doctrine. Federal interventions began then to be
largely administered not through strictly defined programs but through
‘block grants’ allowing state governments to spend the money at their
own discretion. During the last few decades, numerous judicial sentences
involving inter-territorial conflicts, especially on social-moral issues
such as the use of medical drugs, abortion, gay marriage, assisted suicide,
gun possession and death penalty, have reestablished some balance
between the central and the state governments implicit in the federal
project.
3.2.2. European subsidiarity
The increasing integration of traditional states into the European Union
and the accompanying cession of powers to the EU institutions have
questionedthevalidityof theprincipleof ‘sovereignty’.Anystategovernment
within the Union has ceased to be able to control its state borders, defend
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its territory and protect the internal market as traditional states had done in
order to affirm their undisputed ultimate power.
The European Union laws take precedence over state law and are binding to
state authorities. Most EU’s legislation for a few decades was shaped in form
of ‘directives’, which must be transformed into state laws by the state
governments and parliaments, especially for the operation of the common
market. But since the Maastricht treaty of the European Union in 1992, the
EU institutions produce ‘regulations’, which are binding and directly
enforceable throughout every member state without any action by state
governments.
The issue of how powers and competences should be divided between the
multiple levels of government in Europe has been addressed with the help
of the ‘subsidiarity’ doctrine.The concept of subsidiary was forged by social-
Christian thinkers as a norm to limit the intervention of political powers in
private affairs, while in federal countries such as Belgium and Germany it
implied a bias in favor of decentralization.
The Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union established that its
members are:
“resolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as
closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity … Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at central level or
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”
This principle was confirmed by the Constitution and the treaty of Lisbon,
which established the following:
“1.The limits ofUnion’s competences are governedby theprinciple
of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
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2.Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act within the
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member
States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties
remain with the Member States.
3.Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall
within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and
insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central
level or at regional and local level, but rather, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at
Union level.
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of
subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National
Parliaments ensure compliancewith the principle of subsidiarity
in accordance with the procedure set out in the Protocol.
4.Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form
of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of the Treaties. The institutions of the Union
shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality.” (Art. 3b).
These norms have important implications for institutional decision-
making. First, the European Commission has to demonstrate that a
proposed EU activity passes a subsidiarity ‘test’, implying that it is justified
if it addresses a problem with a trans-border character, it does not distort
trade, and entails added value. Then, in front of any draft of legislative act
of theEU institutions, the stateparliaments canconsult regional parliaments
withlegislativepowerandformulate“reasonedopinions”onitscompatibility
with the principle of subsidiarity. Just one third of members of a state
parliament or one fourth if the issue in question refers to the area of
freedom, security and justice, is sufficient to ask for the draft to be reviewed.
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These opinions can be addressed to the Commission or, if the draft
legislative act originates from them, to the group of member states, the
Parliament or the European Central Bank. After preventive actions from
state or regional governments, ex post judicial review of the EU legislation
concerning compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity could be done
by the European Court of Justice. Formally, the Court has jurisdiction in
actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a
legislative act, although it has tended to avoid the impression that it wants
to act as a constitutional court.
It could be interpreted that the principle of subsidiarity works only in favor
of the states. But in addition to the participation of regional governments in
the parliaments of federal states, already alluded to, some regional
governments can participate in the Council of Ministers of the European
Union and have a say on the EU legislation emanating from that body.
Specifically, a state can be represented in the Council of Ministers by a
regional minister, as happens regularly with the regions of Belgium and the
lands of Germany and, together with the state minister, the lands of Austria,
thenationsofBritainandtheautonomouscommunitiesofSpain,particularly
on matters of agriculture, industry, environment, research, education,
culture, territorial planning, and tourism. A Council of Ministers of the EU
can even be presided over by a regional minister.
Also, the Committee of the Regions may bring actions against legislative
acts. The subsidiarity principle has been heralded by the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities, a non-EU institution. But its principles have been
recently ratified by a Committee of Ministers of the EUmember-states with
the following declaration:
“One of the bases of a democratic society is the existence of a solid
and effective local and regional democracy in conformity with
the principle of subsidiarity included in the European Charter of
Local Self-Government, whereby public responsibilities shall be
exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to
the citizens, having regard to the extent and nature of the public
tasks and the requirements of efficiency and economy.” (2007).
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In fact, the subsidiarity principle operates differently in different policy
areas. Ithasbeenstronglypromoted, inparticular,oncertainsocioeconomic
areas on which state governments enforce different regulations and want
to preserve their decision powers regarding redistributive policies (for
example, on unemployment benefits, in spite of Europe-wide labor
mobility). It has also been neatly enforced in areas such as environmental
policy.
Some fluctuations in the relative power of the Union, the states and the
regions can be identified over time. But the institutional framework for
dealing with variable pressures and negotiations is still not as stable in the
European Union as in the United States. The Treaty of Lisbon has formally
established the right of secession of any state from the Union, which might
be used as a negotiation threat. Above all, the possibility of making non-
enforceable decisions by a subset of member-states gives any state strong
powers regarding the Union to try to prevent its further integration at the
European level.
3.3. Division of powers
The federal or quasi-federal institutions of both the American Union and
the European Union are based on complex systems of ‘horizontal’ division
of powers and checks and balances between separate elected institutions.
They use different formulas. While in the United States the main division is
between the legislativeCongress and the executivePresidency, in accordance
to the colonial legacy both in Britain and in the British colonies in North
America, in the European Union the broad picture is closer to the semi-
parliamentary form of government which is used in France and a few other
countries. With any of these formulas, a ‘horizontal’ division of legislative,
executive and judicial powers fosters both cooperative and conflictive
relations between different bodies elected or appointed in different ways.
The building of a sufficiently large political majority in support of inter-
institutional decisions is a complex endeavor, which is crucially driven by
the action of large-scale, encompassing political parties.
62 EUROPE, LIKE AMERICA. THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A CONTINENTAL FEDERATION
3.3.1. United States ‘checks and balances’
Initially,when theBritishcolonies inNorthAmericadeclared independence,
the Articles of Confederation vested extensive powers in the Congress and
made no provision for a separate executive government. But when a new
federal union was embraced, a different balance of powers was designed.
The structure of the legislative body was arranged with the intention to
satisfy the aims of both new unity (in the lower chamber) and protection of
preexisting local powers (in the upper chamber). In contrast, the choice of
a single-person executive was strongly bent in favor of unification.
In a general sense, the institutional framework adopted by the Constitution of
the United States of 1789 was isomorphic with most of the colonial
governments and the evolving governments of the newly independent states,
includingone executive, a bicameral legislature, andan independent judiciary.
But it endowed the presidency with powers traditionally associated to
Europeanmonarchs, which implied indefinite reelection, control of the army,
and veto power over legislation. These were larger powers even than those
actually available to the British king of the moment, since these had already
been significantly reduced by the parliament in a process of balancing inter-
institutional relations. Immediately, the American presidency became the
focal point of the Union, as well as the core for its further territorial
expansion.
It took a long period to establish in practice a real system of mutual ‘checks
and balances’ among institutions. Some of the basic rules for theUnited States
House of Representatives, Senate, Presidency and Supreme Court were not
stablyfixeduntil the early twentieth century. For theHouseofRepresentatives,
seats were allocated to the states in proportion to the population, initially
with a total of 65 seats and providing that the number of representatives
should not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants. During the nineteenth
century, the Congress regularly increased the size of the House to account for
population growth. But it fixed the number of seats at 435 in 1911. As the U.S.
population hasmore than tripled since then, it is currently formed by one seat
per about 700,000 inhabitants in average.
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Each state was allowed to choose its own electoral system to elect its House
members. Initially, eight of the initial 13 states chose a single state-wide
district with plurality rule. This choice was in congruence with the rules
used for their own local and state institutions. But the systemmade a single
set of winners take all, which produced single-party sweeps and a high
number of single-party state systems. This kind of electoral result gave the
representatives of a few large states much decision-making power in the
federal House. In contrast, the other five founding states, as well as most of
the new states joining the Union in the further process, adopted systems
based on smaller single-seat districts, which permit more diversity of state
representatives. There were several attempts to generalize the latter rule,
but the Supreme Court repeatedly supported the states’ rights to choose
their own rules. Single-seat districts have been enforced in all the United
States without exception for elections to the House of Representatives only
since 1970.
The upper federal chamber, the Senate, is formed by two members per state
independently of population. With 50 states in the Union, the Senate has
currently 100 seats. Initially, the senators were elected by the state legislatures,
which usually gave strong leverage in federal matters to state governments.
Popular election to the Senate was established as a general formula for all the
states only in 1913. Senators are elected for a six year term, but about one-
third are elected every two years in concurrence with the House elections.
As mentioned, the President of the United States is appointed by the
Electoral College formed by electors chosen in each state with some
overrepresentation of the small ones. The procedures to select the electors
are decided by the states themselves. Initially, in most states electors were
chosen by the state legislature, a formula which disappeared completely
only in 1876. Alternatively, in order to choose electors by popular vote,
some states replicated the House districts, as well as the state-wide Senate
district, a formula which is still used in Maine and Nebraska. All the other
states and the District of Columbia choose now their electors by popular
vote in a single state-wide district so that only one candidate for president
is backed by each state independently of the distribution of votes among
other candidates.
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Finally, the members of the Supreme Court are nominated by the president
and confirmed by majority vote of the Senate. Justices have life tenure,
which terminatesonlyupondeath, resignation, retirement, or impeachment,
thus making difficult for a single president to appoint a majority of the
members of the Court. Initially, the total number of Justices was six, it
changed several times as the expansion of the Unionmotivated the creation
of new judicial circuits, but it was fixed at nine since 1869.
Nowadays, several mechanisms to produce checks and balances among
institutions exist. Both the Congress and the President control each other to
some extent. On the one hand, while the members of Congress can be re-
elected indefinitely, the President can be elected for only two terms (with a
total of eight years, as established since the mid-twentieth century). The
Senate must ratify and can reject certain presidential appointments for
executive positions, including severalmembers of the cabinet.TheCongress
also appoints a number of officers and controls administrative agencies
(including, for instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development or
USAID and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or NASA).
On the other hand, the President can limit Congress powers, especially by
means of the presidential veto over congressional legislation. Finally, the
Supreme Court submits legislation to judicial revision.
Unifying political parties. A crucial development for the working of such
a complex institutional framework was the formation of Union-wide
political parties. As mentioned, the presidential electoral College was
initially designed in the assumption that no single candidate would be able
to obtain a majority support across states. However, the system indeed
created incentives for building such a broad support around a presidential
candidate, even if such organization implied only loose allegiance within
elections. A presidential election tends always to be a highly polarized
contest, thus favoring the formation of two broad political fractions, groups,
movements or parties. Large-scale electoral campaigns began to develop
since the 1840s, although the two current major political parties only
consolidated after the Civil War. They were also able of maintaining some
cohesion and continuity because no competitive socialist party was formed
at the turn between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in contrast to
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most European countries. According to some hypothesis, this was due in
large part to the recruitment of workers from masses of immigrants with
different ethnic backgrounds and strong individualistic ambitions during
the crucial periods of industrialization and urbanization.
The United States political parties use powerful organizational machines at
thelocal level,butonmanyaspectstheyarestillcoalitionsof localorganizations
under a common umbrella strongly provided by the presidential elections.
The system of primary elections, which was generalized since the early 1970s,
has proved to be able of including a variety of candidacies, policy proposals
and ideological orientations within two large tents, in fact encompassing a
range of positions comparable to many multiparty systems in Europe, that is,
social-democrats, greens and liberals within the Democratic party, and
christian-democrats, conservatives and populists within the Republican
party.
The support for the Presidency, the majority of members in the House and
in the Senate, often belong to different political parties. But counter-
weighting mechanisms between institutions with different political party
orientations play in favor of power-sharing. For the main institutions to be
able to make a joint decision they have to aggregate the different political
party majorities in each institution into a single, broader majority. The
political support necessary for making certain decisions in such a system of
division of powers lies beyond the requirement of a simple majority in each
institution. The effort of aggregating different preferences is similar to that
which would be required in a single institution making decisions by some
qualified-majority rule. This frequently moves the President to try to build
broad majorities beyond his own party to approve legislation in order to
prevent further rejections. Party voting discipline in Congress is relatively
low; for many decades, in about half of the votes in the House, less than 50
percent of the Democrats or the Republicans voted together, although
voting cohesion has increased during the last fifteen years.
It is usually remarked that joint decisions by separate institutions whose
members represent different interests or preferences can hardly be innovative.
Indeed theobstacles introducedbynumerous institutional checksmaystabilize
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socially inefficientstatus-quopolicies.Tobeputmorebluntly, separateelections
anddivided governments can create a ‘dual legitimacy’ prone to ‘deadlock’, also
called ‘stalemate’ or ‘gridlock’, that is, legislative paralysis and inter-institutional
conflict. However, it can also be observed that those institutional mechanisms
guarantee that most important decisions are made by broad majorities able to
prevent the imposition of thewill of a small orminority group. As constitution
co-author Alexander Hamilton argued:
“It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws
includes that of preventing good ones; andmay be used to the one
purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little
weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that
inconstancy and mutability in the laws … because it is favorable
to greater stability in the system of legislation”.
(The Federalist Papers, No. 73, 1788)
Several institutional factors can, thus, help explain the relatively long
duration and stability of the United States’ political regime of division of
powers. As more firmly established in the early twentieth century, the
framework of the United States’ regime implies a set of checks-and-balances
between institutions that is more clearly defined than at its foundational
stages.They embrace, above all, the inclusiveness of the ‘vertical’ division of
powers between the federal and the state governments. At the same time,
the role of Congress before the Presidency has been enhanced by different
means. The biases of the electoral system for the House of Representatives,
based on single-winners by plurality rule, is somewhat counteracted by
primary elections and other forms of participation, especially at local and
state levels, able to incorporate different groups and opinions into the
process. Also, in situations of divided government, the propensity of
bipartism to produce conflict or paralysis is reduced by significant levels of
non-ideological inclusiveness of local and single-issue popular demands
and low levels of party discipline, which gives congress a more relevant role
in the legislative process.
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3.3.2. European consensus
For half a century, the institutions of the European Union evolved from
relations corresponding to an international organization to others
approaching a federal union. During the first thirty years, from 1957 to mid
1986, the central institutionwas theCouncil ofMinisters, whichwas formed
by representatives of the governments of the member-states. As they
considered themselves to be sovereign, each member-state had veto power
on collective decisions, which means that most decisions were made by
unanimity. Actually, many important strategic decisions were made –also
by unanimity– at summit meetings of Heads of Government, which were
institutionalized as the European Council in 1974.
Since the creation of the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992, under the leadership of the president of the Commission, Jacques
Delors, more federal-oriented institutional relations developed. These
brought about a reduction of the fields in which unanimity decisions are
required.Differentprovisionswere introduced inorder topromotedecision-
making by a combination of qualified-majority of the Council of Ministers
and simple majority of the European Parliament.
Nowadays, the basic institutional framework of the European Union has
consolidated the two-chamber federal legislative framework with the
Parliament or lower chamber representing the European citizens at large
and the Council of Ministers as an upper chamber of territorial
representation. It has also adopted a kind of semi-parliamentary regime
with a dual executive, the presidential European Council and the
parliamentary Commission, which is similar to the model used in a few
member-states, mainly France.
The European Parliament, together with the Council of Ministers, have
significant decision powers, especially on single market issues and most
economic, social, environmental, research and technology, and cultural
policy areas, as well as in the process of approving the budget of the EU.The
two chambers also share significant powers for the nomination of the
president and theexecutiveboardof theEuropeanCentralBank, thepresident
of the European Monetary Institute, and the members of the Court of
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Auditors. As mentioned, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers have
also significant powers in the appointment and the dismissal of the
Commission and its President.
For the direct popular election of the members of the European Parliament,
all countriesuse some formulaofproportional representation.Eachmember
state can adopt its own rules, which tend to be similar to the rules used in
state elections, but in 1998 the European Parliament called the states to
adopt common principles for the elections of its members.The most visible
exceptions are Britain and France, which use majority rules for state-wide
elections but eventually adopted proportional representation for the
European Parliament.
TheCouncil ofMinisters of theEuropeanUnion is formedby representatives
of the 27 EU’s member states at ‘ministerial level’ (which means that not
onlymembers of the state government but also regionalministers can attend
and even chair, as mentioned). The Council is organized in nine sectoral
councils, each formed by the corresponding branchministers of all member
states. The most important council is the General Affairs Council, which is
formed by the member states’ ministers of Foreign Affairs and, in most
cases, also the minister or secretary of state in charge of European Affairs.
Another prominent sectoral council is the Economic and Financial Affairs
Council.
According to the rules which are expected to keep being enforced until
2017, each of the 27 member states is given a number of weighted votes in
the Council, from 29 votes to the four largest countries, Germany, France,
the United Kingdom and Italy, to 3 votes to the smallest one, Malta, with a
total of 345 votes. The distribution of votes is somewhat biased against the
larger countries, in correspondence to the principle of territorial
representation characteristic of a federal upper chamber. Most decisions
have to be made by a qualified majority of at least 255 votes out of 345
(about 74 %), which must include at least a majority of 14 out of the 27
member states. This rule, nevertheless, creates the possibility to form a
‘blocking minority’ able to prevent a new decision to be made by three large
memberstates togetherwithanyother state.Analternative,moredemanding
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rule which is used for decisions not based on a proposal from the European
Commission, requiring 255 out of 345 weighted votes and two thirds (18
out of 27) of the member states. In all cases the votes must represent at least
62 % of the EU’s total population.
With the new rules to be enforced in the future, each member state would
have a single vote in the Council, but decisions would be made by the so-
called rule of ‘double majority’, which requires 55% of the states (15 states
with a membership of 27) gathering together 65% of the EU’s population.
This rule is more biased against the larger countries than the currently
existing formula, thus reinforcing the federal principle of territorial
representation in the Council. By making decision-making in the Council
more difficult, this rule may contribute to balancing inter-institutional
relations in favor of the Parliament.
The European Commission, which is the EU government, is currently
formedbyonemember fromeachof the 27member states.TheCommission
president can be considered the Prime minister of the EU. The president
and the commissioners are appointed for a period of five years in order to
coincide with the European Parliament term. Within such a period, almost
every member state holds elections that may change the party composition,
the leadership or the personal composition of the corresponding state
governments, as represented in the Council of the EU. This makes the
European Commission quite independent from the state governments and
the political composition of the other EU institutions. The Commission
meets weekly in Brussels.
The Commission has the initiative to set the EU agenda, an extended role
throughout the legislative process to ensure that the Treaties are applied,
including the right to “formulate recommendations and deliver opinions”, a
mediating role between the EU institutions and the member states, and the
right to take a member state to the European Court of Justice. The
Commission has extensive executive powers in areas delegated by the
Council, such as Agriculture, as implemented by its management and
administrative apparatus. Finally, the Commission represents the European
Union in other countries and in many international organizations.
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The European Council, which is the presidency of the EU, is formed by the
27 Heads of Government or State, assisted by the ministers of Foreign
Affairs, meeting together with the President of the European Commission,
the President of the Parliament and the High Representative for Foreign
and Security.TheEuropeanCouncil is an important agenda setter providing
the European Union with both the impetus and the apathy of its uneven
development and defining the general political guidelines thereof. Actually,
the European Council sets the conditions and calendar to accept new
European Union members and associates. Its President, who is a kind of
president of presidents, can be considered the President of the European
Union and its main representative.
The Court of Justice is formed by 27 judges, one per member state, and eight
advocates-general.The judges are appointed for six-year terms and renewed
by halves every three years. The Court of Justice is to ensure that the
EuropeanUnion legislation is equally interpreted and applied in all member
states and it is given primacy over state and local laws. The Court has
jurisdiction to hear disputes among EU institutions, member states, and
citizens. In particular, it can develop proceedings for failure to fulfill an
obligation (usually brought by the Commission against some member
state), for annulment of decisions made by the EU institutions (usually
brought by somemember states), or for failure to act, as well as for damages
and appeals (to be brought by citizens).
Unifyingpoliticalparties.Thecapacity of decision-makingof theEuropean
Union institutions, and particularly of the European Parliament, has been
crucially developed by the aggregative role of Europe-wide political
parties.
Paralleling successive enlargements of the European Union with new
member-states, increasing numbers of different political parties have
obtained representation in the European Parliament, up to almost 200 in
2009. Candidacies, electoral campaigns and voting motives are largely
localistic. Yet the increase in the number of state-wide or regional parties in
theParliamenthas generated increasingdegrees of concentrationof deputies
ina fewEuropeanPoliticalGroups.Thereare remarkablyhighand increasing
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degrees of parliamentarians’ participation and internal cohesion of the
European Political Groups.The average proportions of individual members
of the Parliament voting in accordance to their European Political Group
rises over time up to 90%. The largest Groups –the People’s, the Socialists,
the Liberals and the Greens– have reached the highest degrees of discipline
in voting, between 90 and 95%.
Political pluralism and consensus have been the rule in the EuropeanUnion.
The Parliament and the Council usually had different political party
majorities due to the tendency in the elections to the former to vote against
the incumbent domestic governments and the latter’s composition based
on those governments. But since the elections in 2004 and 2009 a center-
right majority, which is basically made up of members of the People’s and
theLiberalgroups,exists intheParliament, theCouncilandtheCommission,
as well as in the European Council. The typical ‘cohabitation’, which usually
led to broad consensual agreements in the Parliament involving the two
larger parties, the People’s and the Socialists, has been replaced with a
consistent dominion of the center-right through the institutions. In this
context, the new figure of the European Council President might take a
stronger role of political initiative, somehow making the Commission and
its president his collaborator, rather than an independent figure, and
reducing the role of the Parliament.
However, broad multiparty coalitions tend to be formed in the Parliament,
with different party compositions for different policy issues. In the Council,
even if only a qualified majority is legally required, it is common to
deliberately pursue attempts to obtain broader agreements, which produces
many unanimous votes. Consensual decision-making favors citizens’ and
representatives’ support to the existing institutional framework.
Consensus and agreements among European states are also fostered by the
actors’ sense of having a long past and an expected long future in common.
Concessionscanbemadeonsomeissues intheexpectationofcompensations
on others.The long history of permanent conflicts and increasingly frequent
and bloody inter-state wars, as well as the challenges derived from new
technological changes and the subsequent enlargement of the scales of
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human interactions, make relevant European actors aware of the potential
very high costs of major disagreements within the European Union. The
‘unity in diversity’ is also strengthened by sanctioning mechanisms to
enforce EU decisions, which have been in fact accepted as self-obligatory
resorts by the member-states’ representatives.
All in all, the US and the EU have similarities and differences in their basic
institutional frameworks. In both cases, the ‘federal’ character of the union
has led to establish two legislative chambers, respectively representing the
population of the union at large and its member states, that is, the House of
Representatives and the Senate in the US, and the Parliament and the
Council of Ministers in the EU. In contrast, while the executive in the US is
concentrated in the Presidency, the EU has developed a dual executive with
the Presidency of the European Council and the Presidency of the
Commission. In both cases, however, the institutional framework implies a
complex system of ‘checks and balances’ inducing broad inter-institutional
and political negotiations and agreements.
3.3.3. Appendix
Figure 3.1 Political pluralism in the European Union, 1979-2009
MEMBER-STATES POLITICAL PARTIES EUROPEAN POLITICAL GROUPS
NUMBER EFFECTIVE NO. NUMBER NUMBER EFFECTIVE NO.
1979 9 6.0 41 8 5.2
1984 10 6.6 46 9 5.3
1989 12 8.2 70 11 5.0
1994 12 8.1 95 10 4.6
1999 15 9.5 110 8 4.0
2004 25 10.6 170 9 4.3
2009 27 10.8 163 8 4.5
Note: Data correspond to the initial composition of the European Parliament after every election. The ‘effective
number’ (N) is an index of concentration of seats which captures the number and the relative size of the units
represented; it is calculated according to the formula N = 1/∑pi2, where p is the proportion of seats of member-
state, party or group i.
Source: Josep M. Colomer ed. Comparative European Politics, 3rd ed., London: Routledge, 2008.
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IV. From Empire to Federation
Most states in theworldhave been created as a consequence of disintegration
of empires, and some modern empires have been or are being built as an
effort of union from previously existing ‘sovereign’ states. This is the case of
the United States of America, which was created by states previously
separated from the British empire by uniting themselves into a new Union,
and eventually becoming a democratic federation. Likewise, the European
Union has been built during the last fifty years by states mostly formed in a
previous period at the disintegration of traditional empires.
The building of the democratic empires of the United States of America and
the EuropeanUnion has involved processes of territorial expansion from an
initial coreof stateswhichhave takenplace indifferentperiods, but following
comparable models and paths. From the initial cores –13 former colonies
along the Atlantic coast in North America and 6 member-states in the
center of Europe, respectively–, each empire expanded its territory over a
number of decades until it multiplied the initial founders’ territory by about
three or four and the population by two.The assimilation of new territories
and states required increasing efforts as they are located at increasing
distances from the initial center and have significantly different populations
in economic and ethnic terms. In both cases, territorial expansion was able
to assimilate new, relatively close units at the beginning, but it had to adopt
more flexible formulas of linkage and association with less cohesive
territories in themore distant peripheries. For the United States, the process
to establish its basic territorial limits developed over more than 60 years,
while the European Union has not yet reached that stage after more than 50
years of enlargements.
The expansion of the United States was, given the founding members’
eastern location in the continent, mostly westwards. The enlargements of
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the European Union, in contrast, have been, due to the central location of
the founders, first towards the west and the south and later towards the
north and the east. During these processes, some territories at the edges of
the already integrated area have become ‘frontiers’ with uncertain future,
which have been the subject of rivalry with other empires. More stable, the
borders of the United States were established at the Atlantic ocean in the
east, Canada and Alaska in the north, the Gulf of Mexico in the south, and
the Pacific ocean in the west. However, some of these borders, which
included some relatively arbitrary bounds from the point of view of
geographical accidents and population composition, were conflictive and
provoked discomfort and malaise on the other side. Specifically, there have
been sustained political instability and massive migrations to the United
States fromMexico, the islands in the Caribbean sea and Central America.
Analogously, the borders of the European Union are now established at the
Atlantic ocean in the west, the Arctic ocean in the north, and the
Mediterranean sea in the south. But, somewhat undefined and disputed
frontiers still exist in the Balkans, with Turkey, and in eastern regions under
the influence of the Russian empire.The full membership to the EU of some
of these countries may depend on pending democratization and
institutionalization, which may make the area a kind of temporary ‘Wild
East’ of the Union. Not integrating some areas might imply the persistence
of conflicts, violence and migrations around the European Union. The
Balkans risk becoming the Caribbean of Europe, with comparable features
of internal instability, mass emigration and recurrent hostility to the Union,
while the exclusion of Turkey from Europe would parallel that of Mexico
from the American Union, with its subsequent effects of isolationism and
resentment.
From its foundation in the late eighteenth century and for more than one
hundred years, the founding states of the American union kept their
‘sovereign’ rights, very different institutions existed across the territory
(including direct rule from Washington) and the territorial limits of the
union were undefined. Only a few decades after the inter-state, intra-
American Civil War were the limits of the steady expansion of the United
States established. It was then, as late as the early twentieth century that the
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unionmanaged to organize all the territory in states with elected legislatures
and governors, the federal Senate was elected with homogeneous rules in all
the states, and the creation of the Federal Reserve forced monetary union.
Starting in the aftermath of the intra-European civil war called Second
World War, and during a period of more than fifty years, the European
Union has followed a comparable path to the previous American experience
to eradicate war and establish security, create a great common market and
set the institutional frame for the provision of large-scale public goods over
an extended territory.
The abolition of internal borders in the European Union has been the result
of a long process. Economic frontiers for trade, investment and work were
formally abolished with the official ‘completion’ of the SingleMarket (1992),
while free movement of citizens, not only workers, was established by the
Maastricht Treaty (1993) and reinforced by the Schengen agreement among
a subset of the member states (1999). As happened in America about one
hundred years before, the abolition of internal borders, which erodes the
powers of the states, created an ‘area of freedom’, but it provoked demands
for an area of security and justice which strengthens the powers of the
Union.
4.1. Integration and decentralization
The average state in the USA has nowadays about sixmillion inhabitants.The
average state in the EU is much more populated, about 18 million, but
the establishment of numerous regional governments with legislative
powers within the largest states is approaching the average size of
the European territorial communities to the American level, as well as to the
average state in the world.
The increase of internal exchanges and the reduction of the strength of
internal borders are much favored by the establishment of fixed external
borders which gives each territory more alternative options of relations
with other territories within the Union. Internal trade and the economic
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specialization of different territories tend to reduce the inter-state economic
inequalities previously generated by protective state-level policies, their
rivalry and conflicts, as well as favor some broad scale cohesion in cultural
terms.
In Europe the differences in per capita income between member states are
maintained up to a proportion of 4:1, double than in the United States.
Actually, income disparities among regions are much higher, up to 12:1, as
between Inner London, Brussels and Luxembourg on one side, and
Severozapaden in North West Bulgaria and North East Romania on the
other.Although there is increasing emigration fromrelatively disadvantaged
regions, their governments also compete for foreign investments, mostly on
the basis of lower labor costs, at the same time that they seek redistribution
through EU subsidies. But, as happened in the past in the United States,
Europe-wide free trade diminishes the previous advantages of large states
in protecting large markets to local producers. Free trade in a large area also
promotes economic specialization of small regions, which facilitates the
reduction of economic disparities in per capita income.
Along these lines in favor of further integration, the EU introduced the
concept of ‘territorial cohesion’ in 1986, togetherwith the goal of completing
the Single Market. In particular, the Union aims at reducing disparities
between the levels of development of the various regions and the
backwardness of the least favored ones, including rural areas, those affected
by industrial transition, with very low population density, islands,
crossborder and mountain regions. The initial ‘structural funds’ were
supplemented with the so-called ‘cohesion fund’, which was limited to states
with per capita income below 90% of the EU average. In practice, these were
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in Southern Europe in the 1990s, and
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Poland in Eastern Europe since their
membership.
Increasing European integration induces internal territorial restructuring
of the larger states. Nowadays, the six larger states in the European Union
have adopted formulas of political decentralization with elected regional
parliaments and governments, including Germany (the only one of the
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large which was previously organized as a federation), Italy, Spain, France,
the United Kingdom, and Poland, as well as Austria and Belgium. State
decentralization develops at different paces and with different formulas, but
all benefit from the opportunities for alternative inter-territorial relations
provided by membership of the European Union and move in the direction
of increasing decentralization and asymmetry between some of its units.
Within the framework of a very large federationwith significant integration,
the initial independence and claims of sovereignty of the founding states,
each with its specific institutional formulas, tend to make room for
multilateral relations. States’ rights in the USA and the principle of
subsidiarity in the EU have been proposed as guides for the distribution of
powers among a ‘vertical’ set of government levels.
4.2. Building federal institutions
At the federal level, a complex system of ‘horizontal’ division of powers and
checks and balances between separate elected institutions characterize the
institutional architecture of both the United States of America and the
European Union. The balance between institutions, including the choice of
parliamentary or presidential formulas, was present in the constituent
processes of both Unions. The United States structure turns around the
relations between the separately elected Presidency and Congress. In
contrast, the European Union is organized more like a semi-parliamentary
regime with a dual executive, the presidential European Council and the
parliamentary Commission. In both America and Europe, the formation of
complex political majorities is needed to support institutional decisions
and crucially helped by the role of union-wide encompassing political
parties, although these are based on strongly autonomous local and state
organizations.
The federalization of public policies has not followed the same path on the
two sides of the Atlantic. The USA was more strongly motivated by the wars
of independence to create a federal army and has accumulated extraordinary
military might. The US Constitution gave Congress the power to enact
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federal laws (‘acts’, ‘statutes’ and ‘regulations’) that are directly enforceable,
while the EU produces both ‘directives’, which need to be transformed into
state laws, and directly enforceable ‘regulations’. The federal government in
the United States heavily relies on a federal income tax, while the EU fiscal
policy is based on sales tax, while still leaving to the states other fiscal policies
with presumedhigher redistributive capacity. BothUnions gave somepriority
to the creation of a common currency and monetary policy by the central
bank, although the Europeans introduced major regulations for the creation
of a single market.
Currently, a significant difference regarding the stage of the evolution of the
two Unions on both sides of the Atlantic is reflected in the fact that not all
27 member-states of the European Union are equally integrated. The initial
military alliance under the umbrella of the USA, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, does not include six EU member-states, Austria, Cyprus,
Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden, while, in contrast, it does include a few
non-EUmembers, Iceland, Norway and Turkey.The common currency, the
euro, was enforced since 2002, but maintaining Britain, Denmark and
Sweden outside, while the rest of membership up to 24 member-states is
planned to be completed by 2015. The Schengen agreements on borders
control, police and judicial cooperation started from an agreement among
France, Germany and the BeNeLux countries in 1985, it does not include
BritainandIreland(nor therecentmembersBulgaria,CyprusandRomania),
while, in contrast, has been signed up by a few non-EU members, Iceland,
Norway and Switzerland.
A significant implication of territorial and institutional consolidation of a
great federation, like the USA and the EU, is its capacity of developing a
foreign policy. The USA was initially created as a union against a foreign
enemy, the UK, and its hostilities and alliances with other countries
depended on this conflict. For a very long period, its foreign policy focused
ondefining andkeeping its borders.Only after its territorial and institutional
consolidation as a democratic federation at the beginning of the twentieth
century, could the USA develop a broader foreign policy, especially with its
participation inWWIandWWIIand theColdWarwith theUSSR.Likewise,
the EU was initially created as a union against a foreign enemy, the USSR,
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and in strong alliance with the USA. This alliance somewhat weakened
since the 1970s and especially after the end of the Cold War. But as the EU
borders are not yet defined, the EUhas not developed a broad and consistent
common foreign policy.
All these disparities confirm the idea that the European Union is still at an
‘imperial stage’, characterized by high economic inequality, low attachment
of citizens to the Union institutions, and significant diversity of institutional
formulas among its members. However, as reviewed in the previous pages,
the outline of a potentially more democratic and efficient federal union in
Europe able to promote loyalty from its citizens is basically designed and
positively tested. The full institutionalization of all territories of the United
States, which implied high social internal cohesion, required about 125
years. In the European Union, a consistent, robust and stable constitutional
formula has not yet been achieved. In order to do so, the most crucial
decision ahead of the European Union is the establishment of clear borders
of the union, which appears to be a condition for further stability,
consolidation and progress.
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The processes of building the United States of America since the late-eighteenth
century and the European Union since mid-twentieth century are among the major
claims for the possibility of a vast, continental-size polity based on democratic
principles. While the European Union project is still full of uncertainties, the previous
experience of building the United States of America offers the best reference for
advancing towards a democratic federation.
In this new volume from the Economic Studies Series of the Research Department of
”la Caixa”, Josep M. Colomer shows that the territorial limits of the European Union,
like those of the American Union in the past, are not determined by geography
or destiny but reflect the union’s capacity to assimilate and institutionalize its
components. Building an empire from previously existing states implies renouncing
a single source of sovereignty in favour of dividing power among multiple levels of
government.
Josep M. Colomer is an elected member of the Academia Europaea and a life
member of the American Political Science Association. Author of more than thirty
books in six languages.
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